

# FM 21-77

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

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## EVASION AND ESCAPE

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HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

MAY 1958







## FIELD MANUAL

No. 21-77

HEADQUARTERS  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C., 19 December 1958

## EVASION AND ESCAPE

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**\*This manual together with FM 21-77A, 5 January 1959 supersedes DA Pam 21-46, 19 October, including C1, 11 May 1954.**

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

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### 1. Purpose and Scope

#### *a. Purpose.*

- (1) This manual is a guide to commanders in the training and indoctrination of personnel in the principles and techniques of evasion and escape. It is the basis for all evasion and escape training conducted in the active Army and the Reserve components.
- (2) The material presented herein is applicable without modification to both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare.

#### *b. Scope.*

- (1) This manual contains doctrine for evasion and escape training and operations which has been accepted on the basis of experience gained by the United States and its allies during World War I, World War II, and the Korean conflict. Factual information is presented in the form of principles, procedures, and techniques that have been used successfully worldwide. Specific area intelligence and techniques are not included in this manual, but will be

given the individual soldier through special briefings after he has arrived overseas.

- (2) This manual and its classified supplement, FM 21-77A, present all phases of the evasion and escape program necessary for the training and indoctrination of troops in the continental United States.

## **2. Necessity for Training**

That some men were captured in Korea when ways to avoid it existed indicates clearly the necessity for training personnel in evasion principles and techniques. Troops must be trained to recognize and act on the most feasible alternative that presents itself. Most important, they must be convinced that so long as a means to avoid capture and evade exists, surrender is not to be accepted. They must be continually reminded that they are not free as individuals to choose to become a POW as long as someone capable of assuming leadership of the group is present or as long as an alternative exists. The evasion area is merely an extension of the battlefield. A trained soldier properly indoctrinated will be mentally and spiritually prepared to follow his leaders. If separated, he will be capable of taking appropriate action on his own.

## **3. Definitions**

*a. Evasion and Escape.* The procedures and operations whereby United States and allied military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or unfriendly area to areas under allied or neutral control.



*b. Evader (or Evadee).* Any person who is cut off behind enemy lines but succeeds, with organized or unorganized assistance, in eluding physical capture. Units separated or cut off by the enemy for brief periods or troops having special missions are not evaders.

*c. Escapee.* Any person who has been physically captured by the enemy and succeeds in freeing himself.

*d. Returnee.* Any person who, during the time spent eluding the enemy, received no assistance but alone or with other returnees infiltrated to his own troops without dependence entirely on force of arms. Members of organized reconnaissance, combat, or patrol missions are not returnees.

*e. Briefing.* Instruction of personnel in evasion and escape with respect to a specified area under a current military situation.

*f. Debriefing.* Determining through interrogation of recovered personnel the category of the individual (evader, escapee, returnee) and the extent of his knowledge of sensitive aspects of the evasion and escape program, and the security indoctrination of those possessing information that must be safeguarded.

*g. Short Range Evasion.* Tactics and techniques employed by units, groups, or individuals to avoid capture in the enemy combat zone. Examples are units or individuals bypassed during an enemy breakthrough.

*h. Long Range Evasion.* Tactics and techniques employed by evasion groups or individuals to survive and avoid capture when traveling far behind enemy lines. *Example:* An escapee from an

enemy POW camp or Air Force personnel forced to land in enemy territory.

*i. Breakout.* A tactic employed by units or individuals when surrounded by the enemy to disengage and return to friendly lines.

*j. Infiltration.* A course of action, usually characterized by stealth and deception, which enables a unit commander or an individual to return to friendly lines through enemy-held areas.

*k. Enemy Sympathizer (or POW Collaborator)*  
A prisoner of war who was either an enemy sympathizer or collaborator, or both, during his stay in a prison camp.

*l. Brainwashing.* A calculated attempt to distort men's convictions and principles. This word was coined by the Chinese communists and is generally widely misused. Brainwashing is designed to alter men's attitudes and principles and to supply them with a mass of communist-oriented information. It is not a "third degree" but is a carefully planned, well-thought-out educational process.

## CHAPTER 2

### HISTORY OF EVASION AND ESCAPE

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#### Section I. GENERAL

#### 4. General Concept of Guerilla Warfare

*a.* Evasion and escape by military personnel is not new. Throughout military history, units and individuals that have been cut off from parent organizations have employed evasion and escape techniques in returning to friendly lines. However, evasion and escape was not recognized as a separate entity until World War II. Prior to that time it was accomplished by individuals and units without preplanning or organization.

*b.* The tradition and esprit of the United States Army have been built by the courage and fighting qualities of its soldiers over the nearly two hundred-year span of Army history. These traditions are transmitted to each man who enters the Army, and they can be preserved only by each man's conduct in fighting the enemy. Every soldier has an obligation to himself, his country, and to the thousands of brave men before him who fostered the spirit and traditions of the Army. The challenge to a man's courage and valor is greatest when he faces the enemy alone, but a soldier's moral obligation to his country and to the Army never changes, regardless of his situation. Under all circumstances, a soldier is duty bound to put his mission above his personal safety. The duty to evade capture, if possible, and to escape from the

enemy, if captured, are moral obligations of the U. S. fighting, man.

*c. Evasion* is classified as either short range or long range; escape is classified as either escape from forward areas, while in transit, or from a prisoner of war camp or inclosure. The Army's evasion and escape program is based on short-range evasion and early escape in forward areas. While long-range evasion and escape from POW camps is essential in the program, the importance of placing greater emphasis on short-range evasion and early escape cannot be overemphasized.

## **5. Legal Status of Evaders, Escapees, and Prisoners of War**

*a.* Escapees and evaders have certain legal rights under International Law. These rights are clearly defined and set forth in the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1929. They are restated in the Revised Geneva Convention of 1949. The rights of prisoners of war are first defined in the Geneva Convention and then restated and amplified in the Revised Geneva Convention. With the exception of Communist China, all nations have signed the Revised Geneva Convention, but not all have ratified them. Many nations at the time they signed the Revised Geneva Convention entered serious reservations with respect to the treatment of prisoners of war.

*b.* Section I, Article 17, of the Revised Geneva Convention states what information must be given by a prisoner of war. It also forbids the mistreatment or coercion of prisoners of war in the effort to obtain information other than the prisoner's individual identity. This article reads as follows:

"Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first name, and rank, date of birth, and Army, regimental, personnel or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.

"If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges according to his rank or status."

c. The following articles of the Revised Geneva Convention apply to escape and evasion:

*Article 42*

"The use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially against those who are escaping or attempting to escape, shall constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded by warnings appropriate to the circumstances."

*Article 91*

"The escape of a prisoner of war shall be deemed to have succeeded when:

1. He has joined the Armed Forces of the Power on which he depends or those of an allied power;

2. He has left the territory under the control of the Detaining Power, or of an ally of the said Power;

3. He has joined a ship flying the flag of the Power on which he depends, or of an allied Power, in the territorial waters of the Detaining Power, the said ship not being under the control of the last named power. Prisoners of war who have made good their escape in the sense of this

article and who are recaptured, shall not be liable to any punishment in respect of their previous escape."

#### *Article 92*

"A prisoner of war who attempts to escape and is recaptured before having made good his escape in the sense of Article 91 shall be liable only to a disciplinary punishment in respect of this act, even if it is a repeated offense.

"A prisoner of war who is recaptured shall be handed over without delay to the competent military authority.

"Article 88, fourth paragraph, notwithstanding, prisoners of war punishment as a result of unsuccessful escape may be subjected to special surveillance. Such surveillance must not affect the state of their health, must be undergone in a prisoner of war camp, and must not entail the suppression of any of the safeguards granted them by the present Convention."

#### *Article 93*

"Escape or attempt to escape, even if it is a repeated offense, shall not be deemed an aggravating circumstance if the prisoner of war is subject to trial by judicial proceedings in respect of an offense committed during his escape or attempt to escape.

"In conformity with the principle stated in Article 83, offenses committed by prisoners of war with the sole intention of facilitating their escape and which do not entail any violence

against life or limb, such as offenses against public property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian clothing, shall occasion disciplinary punishment only.

"Prisoners of war who aid or abet an escape or an attempt to escape shall be liable on this count to disciplinary punishment only."

#### *Article 94*

"If an escaped prisoner of war is recaptured, the Power on which he depends shall be notified thereof in the manner defined in Article 122, provided notification of his escape has been made."

### **6. Basic Reasons for an Evasion and Escape Program**

There are numerous reasons why training in techniques to be followed behind enemy lines in evading capture, resisting interrogation, and escaping from enemy control will pay dividend's far out of proportion to the time and effort expended in training. Six of these reasons are as follows:

*a. Humanitarian Reasons.* Anyone with knowledge of the treatment of prisoners of war by the communists has no illusions concerning the horrors of imprisonment by them. Exceptions exist, but in general it is a life of slave labor, devoid of all creature comforts, barely enough food to sustain life, insufficient clothing and shelter to protect against disease, mental and

physical cruelty that defy description, and a slow but inexorable deterioration. Our soldiers must be taught to avoid this fate, and this can best be accomplished by teaching them the principles and techniques of evasion and escape.

*b. Beneficial Influence on Morale of Our Own Forces.* The beneficial impact on the morale of a unit when one of its men returns to his unit after being listed as missing in action is tremendous. The knowledge that a man reported missing has returned cannot fail to raise the spirits of the entire unit and impress all personnel with the proof that evasion or escape can be accomplished.

*c. Preservation of Manpower.* Today's warfare is fought by highly trained experts. Much time, effort, and money go into the development of a soldier. His capture means that his country has lost the services of a well-trained and valuable man. A sidelight illustrating merely the monetary advantages of the recovery of personnel from behind enemy lines is found in a computation made by the Air Force during the pre-Normandy period of World War II. At that time, our personnel engaged in operations against Germany in Northern Europe was limited to airmen. Approximately 2,000 pilots and members of aircrews, shot down behind enemy lines, were recovered after successful evasion of capture or escape from enemy control. The Air Force computed that an average of \$30,000 had been expended in the training of each. So, by simple multiplication, an investment of \$60,000,000, which might otherwise have been entirely lost, was regained for future use. More important by far, however, is the recovery of the individual soldier as a human being.



*d. Safeguarding of Military Information.* The two principal benefits the enemy receives from the capture of our soldiers are the reduction in the number of combatants opposing them and the possibility of obtaining military information. Proper training in evasion and escape techniques reduces the number of our soldiers who may be captured and subsequently subjected to enemy interrogation. And proper indoctrination in means and methods of resisting enemy interrogation further reduces the chances that the enemy will benefit from the capture of our personnel.

*e. Impediments to Enemy's War Efforts.* One of the great indirect benefits from the efforts of our personnel behind enemy lines to evade capture or to escape from enemy control is the enormous expenditure of manpower by the enemy to prevent the success of such efforts by our soldiers. Enemy soldiers searching for our evaders or trying to recapture our escapees are just that many soldiers who cannot be used to attack our lines or defend against our attacks. The fact that an escapee or evader is known to be free in enemy territory serves to tie up many enemy personnel in search activities. This "nuisance value" of evasion and escape should not be underestimated.

*f. Collection of Information.* Our evaders and escapees are trained military personnel. What they see as they make their way back to our lines is viewed through the eyes of soldiers. And what they see and report back to our intelligence officers is often information of the highest military value enemy units in contact or reserve, equipment, activity of a nature to indicate the enemy's

probable courses of action, military installations, and morale.

## **Section II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

### **7. General**

The past history of what has been done to assist personnel to evade the enemy or to escape if captured proves that this is a highly developed and successful program, not just a wishful expression of a humanitarian hope. A short, general sketch of this history will illustrate the extent and seriousness with which this field has been covered.

### **8. Development of Techniques**

#### *a. World War I.*

- (1) World War I, being chiefly ground warfare over a "no man's land" between opposing forces in trenches, was of such a nature that short range evasion was scarcely feasible. Escape activity among allied prisoners of war in German POW camps; however, was prevalent. Without preplanning or organization, British and French prisoners in Germany developed techniques for combating the enemy behind his own lines that materially aided the allied war effort. Numerous escapes disrupted German military plans to a large extent, and the Germans were compelled to utilize large numbers of their troops searching for the escapees. Fraternization

with civilian populace was widespread and resulted in the undermining of enemy morale. Sabotage of the German war economy was extensive and effective.

- (2) Official records reveal that approximately 107,000 allied prisoners of war escaped from German POW camps during World War I.

*b. World War II.*

- (1) The British, recognizing the accomplishments of World War I prisoners, initiated evasion and escape plans for World War II soon after the conflict began. These plans provided for the extrication of British prisoners of war of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in Germany and elsewhere; the publication of instructions on evasion and escape; the collection and dissemination of information obtained from the debriefing of ex-prisoners of war and evaders; and the development of counterescape measures for German POW's.
- (2) The American evasion and escape organization became operational on 1 January 1943. It was placed in G2, War Department General Staff, where it worked in the interest of all services in matters of policy and coordination.
- (3) A special school for carefully selected military personnel from all branches of the service provided a nucleus of instructors capable of directing escape

and evasion training both in the zone of interior and in oversea theaters. On a wider basis, a training program was instituted for combat personnel. In the earlier days of the war this training was directed primarily at Army Air Corps personnel whose missions usually took them behind enemy lines, but briefings for ground force personnel also were inaugurated.

*c. Post World War II.* With the cessation of hostilities in the Pacific area, the hasty demobilization of the Armed Forces began. At this time, Army G3 was given cognizance of evasion and escape problems, but responsibility was not assigned.

*d. Korean Conflict.*

- (1) Early during the Korean conflict thousands of Americans who had never been briefed on evasion and escape found themselves cut off behind enemy lines. Inadequately briefed on evasion possibilities, and as a result confused as to their responsibilities, very few of these men attempted to evade capture or to escape once they had been captured. Those whose natural instincts led them to evade or escape made many obvious blunders which could have been avoided by a minimum of training. Furthermore, captured Chinese documents attest to the fact that some of our captured soldiers were revealing military information without compulsion and that many of them

were apparently accepting communist indoctrination.

- (2) To remedy this situation, the Department of the Army in February 1951 established a training program in evasion and escape designed to reach not only personnel already committed to combat but also to cover the indoctrination of all U.S. Army personnel destined for overseas shipment.

*e. Post Korean Conflict.* Following the truce agreements in Korea, interrogation of repatriated American prisoners of war from all services indicated the great need for evasion and escape training and instruction in methods of resisting interrogation and indoctrination. The conduct of some American prisoners in communist camps led to the promulgation of the current Code of Conduct in the form of a Presidential Executive Order.

## **Section III. CODE OF CONDUCT**

### **9. Duties of the Prisoner of War**

*a.* Due to the nature of modern warfare, it is possible that units or individuals will be cut off or otherwise isolated from friendly forces. This isolation does not relieve the small unit commander or the individual of his responsibility in fighting the enemy. The duty of every soldier is to fight under any circumstances, whether he is alone or with his unit. If captured, the POW inclosure or camp becomes an extension of the battlefield for the

prisoner of war and he must continue fighting the enemy with any means available to him.

*b.* The means of resisting the enemy after capture are obviously limited since the POW is subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the armed forces of the detaining power. His resistance must become passive or be carried on surreptitiously. Capture does not relieve the officer or noncommissioned officer of the responsibilities of his rank. If senior, he must assume command of all American POW's, or if junior, he must follow the orders of his seniors. The evasion situation or POW status does not change the established principles of command; the methods of issuing and following the commands merely change to meet conditions imposed by the captors.

## **10. Support for the Prisoner of War**

The Code of Conduct applicable to each member of the Armed Forces is prescribed by Executive Order No. 10631, 17 August 1955, and announced in DA Bulletin 13, 1955. The spirit of the code has long prevailed in the Army. Military training in support of this code has the primary objective of increasing unit fighting strength and individual will to resist. In no way should it assume the approach of merely training soldiers how to behave as prisoners of war, but should, through training and indoctrination, instill in them the will and the courage to avoid capture, or if captured, to resist interrogation and indoctrination, and to escape. In addition, this training will assure the soldier that—

*a.* Even as a prisoner of war, he continues to be of special concern to the United States; he will not be

forgotten.

*b.* Every available national means will be employed to establish contact with, to support, and to gain his release.

*c.* The laws of the United States provide for the support and care of his dependents during periods in which a member of the Armed Forces serves in POW status.

## **11. Meaning of the Code of Conduct**

*a.* Every member of the Armed Forces is to measure up to the standards embodied in the Code of Conduct while he is in combat with his unit or during captivity. Complete and loyal observance of the spirit and letter of this code is in the best interest of the nation, Army, unit, and the individual. The six articles of the Code of Conduct with their interpretation are as follows:

## I

I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

## II

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

## III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

*Interpretation*

A member of the Armed Forces is always a fighting man.

As such, it is his duty to oppose the enemies of the United States regardless of the circumstances in which he may find himself, whether in active participation in combat or as a prisoner of war.

As an individual, a member of the Armed Forces may never voluntarily surrender himself. When isolated and he can no longer inflict casualties on the enemy, it is his duty to evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly forces. The responsibility and authority of a commander never extends to the surrender of his command to the enemy while it has power to resist or evade. When isolated, cut off, or surrounded, a unit must continue to fight until relieved or able to rejoin friendly forces by breaking out or by evading the enemy.

The duty of a member of the Armed Forces to continue resistance by all means at his disposal is not lessened by the misfortune of capture. Article 82 of the Geneva Conventions pertains and must be explained. He will escape if able to do so and will assist others to escape. Parole agreements are



### *Interpretation*

promises given the captor by a prisoner of war upon his faith and honor to fulfill stated conditions, such as not to bear arms or not to escape, in consideration of special privileges, usually release from captivity or lessened restraint. He will never sign or enter into a parole agreement.

## IV

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

Informing or any other action to the detriment of a fellow prisoner is despicable and is expressly for bidden. Prisoners of war must avoid helping the enemy identify fellow prisoners who may have knowledge of particular value to the enemy and may therefore be made to suffer coercive interrogation. Strong leadership is essential to discipline. Without discipline, camp organization, resistance, and even survival may be impossible. Personal hygiene, camp sanitation, and care of sick and wounded are imperative. Officers and noncommissioned officers of the United States will continue to carry out their responsibilities and exercise their authority subsequent to capture. The senior line officer or noncommissioned officer within the prisoner of war camp or group of prisoners will assume

### *Interpretation*

command according to rank (or precedence) without regard to Service. This responsibility and accountability may not be evaded. If the senior officer or noncommissioned officer is incapacitated or unable to act for any reason, command will be assumed by the next senior. If the foregoing organization cannot be effected, an organization of elected representatives as provided for the Articles 79-81 Geneva Conventions relative to treatment of prisoners of war, or a covert organization, or both, will be formed.

## V

When questioned should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

When questioned, a prisoner of war is required by the Geneva Convention and permitted by this code to disclose his name, rank, service number, and date of birth. A prisoner of war may also communicate with the enemy regarding his individual health or welfare as a prisoner of war and, when appropriate, on routine matters of camp administration. Oral or written confessions, true or false, questionnaires, personal history statements, propaganda recordings and broadcasts, appeals to other prisoners of war, signatures to peace or surrender

appeals, self -criticisms, or any other oral or written communication on behalf of the enemy or critical or harmful to the United States, its allies, the Armed Forces, or other prisoners are forbidden.

It is a violation of the Geneva Convention to place a prisoner of war under physical or mental torture or any other form of coercion to secure from him information of any kind. If, however, a prisoner is subjected to such treatment, he will endeavor to avoid by every means the disclosure of any information, or the making of any statement, or the performance of any action harmful to the interests of the United States or its allies or which will provide aid or comfort to the enemy. Under Communist Bloc reservations to the Geneva Convention, the signing of a confession or the making of a statement by a prisoner is likely to be used to convict him as a war criminal under the laws of his captors. This conviction has the effect of removing him from the prisoner of war status and, according to this Communist Block device, denying him any protection under terms of the Geneva Convention -

## VI

I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

*Interpretation*

tion and repatriation until a prison sentence is served.

The provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, whenever appropriate, continue to apply to members of the Armed Forces while prisoners of war. Upon repatriation, the conduct of prisoners will be examined as to the circumstances of capture and through the period of detention with due regard for the rights of the individual and consideration of the conditions of captivity. A member of the Armed Forces who becomes a prisoner of war has a continuing obligation to remain loyal to his country, his service, and his unit.

The life of a prisoner of war is hard. He must never give up hope. He must resist enemy indoctrination. Prisoners of war who stand firm and united against the enemy will aid one another in surviving this ordeal.

- b. Instruction in the Code of Conduct will be given to all Army personnel and a record of the instruction will be entered in the remarks section (DA Forms 66 (Officer Qualification Record) and 20 (Enlisted Qualification. Record)) of officer and enlisted records.

# CHAPTER 3

## SHORT RANGE EVASION

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### Section I. GENERAL

#### 12. Special Aspects of Short Range Evasion

It is not feasible to distinguish by either time or distance where short-range evasion ends and long range evasion begins. The difference lies in the conditions which confront the evader. Principles remain generally the same while techniques vary to meet the requirements of different situations. Generally, short range evasion occurs in the forward combat zone within a matter of hours or perhaps days following isolation and when the soldier or small unit is still in good physical condition, has adequate food and clothing, and is generally oriented as to direction, distance, and terrain. In contrast, the long-range evader, usually an escaped prisoner of war, must operate over terrain completely strange to him and has little or no food or equipment.

#### 13. Hazard of Isolating Units

*a.* Studies of World War II and the Korean conflict show that our greatest losses in prisoners of war occurred in isolated units-units physically separated from other friendly forces. Approximately three-fourths of the men captured in Korea reported that their unit had been isolated by enemy action. A

comparable portion of those taken prisoner during World War II gave a similar reason for their capture.

*b.* In any future war isolation on the battlefield will be a common occurrence. Units will be deliberately deployed in such a manner as to be separated from other friendly forces. It will be a part of the overall plan that these units remain separated and hold their positions for extended periods. The need to disperse against the threat of nuclear attack, along with the known communist preference for the tactic of encirclement, will create highly fluid conditions on the battlefield. Under a modern concept of land warfare, the threat of isolation confronts all units within the theater. Frontline tactical units may be bypassed during a major enemy offensive and rear area or service units cut off by enemy airborne or amphibious invasion.

## **14. Causes of Capture**

Capture can result from many different sets of circumstances. It can result from giving up the fight before all other alternatives have been tried or at least seriously considered. On the other hand, it may be the outcome of a situation in which the only choice is life or death. This chapter is not concerned with those cases of capture in which there is no alternative. It is concerned primarily with those cases in which the fight is given up before the situation becomes truly hopeless. Reports made by repatriated prisoners of war reveal that an isolated individual usually has enough time to attempt another course of action before being captured. In some cases, the time that elapsed before capture

varied from a few hours to several days.

## **15. Supply as a Factor in Capture**

*a.* Another significant point brought out in case studies of returned personnel was that the problem of supply is not likely to be decisive during short range evasion in contrast to long range evasion. In Korea, in more than 7 out of 10 cases studied, units that were captured still had enough ammunition to operate effectively. In more than 9 out of 10 cases, a lack of food was not a factor. During short-range evasion, most supply problems can be solved by resourcefulness and the prompt use of emergency measures such as immediate redistribution of available supply, including food, weapons, and ammunition recovered from the dead. *Strong and effective leadership* while the situation is still under control is essential.

## **Section II. COURSES OF ACTION**

### **16. General Methods**

When a unit is isolated, many courses of action that will enable the group or its individual members to avoid capture and return to friendly lines may be considered. Five general methods discussed below are—

- a.* Defense of present position.
- b.* Breakout to areas under friendly control.
- c.* Evasion by infiltration.
- d.* Deeper penetration to conduct guerilla opera-

tions.

*e.* Combination of any of the above.

## **17. Defense of Present Position**

*a.* General.

- (1) There may be no alternative other than to defend the position. Our defensive doctrine contemplates the selection and organization of a battle position to be held at all costs. In such a situation, the decision either to hold or to attempt evasion does not rest with the isolated unit commander or the individual soldier. When the order to defend is received, the area must be held pending the completion of the maneuver of other forces or until such order is rescinded or superseded.
- (2) The decision to defend an isolated position should be based upon many factors, including the probability of relief by friendly forces and the possibility of holding off the enemy and eventually forcing him to withdraw. If the commander of an isolated unit has the means of conducting an aggressive and determined defense, the inherent risk is normally justified. For example, during the battle for the Hurtgen Forest in World War II, the commander of Company B, 109th Infantry, 28th Division, decided to hold his isolated position and fight it out with superior German forces. Although a reinforcing unit had failed to break through in relief and water and ammunition were low, the unit,



consisting of only 75 men, continued to fight. They held successfully until relieved by friendly elements 3 days later.

*b. Requirements for Successful Defense.*

- (1) Defense of a position after being cut off requires time and adequate information of the enemy, including among other items his disposition, strength, and capabilities. Without such information, the leader or the individual who chooses to dig in and fight may be overlooking some better way to avoid capture. However, he should not feel that a lack of enemy information necessitates abandoning any thought of defense. In many cases, the commander may feel that a calculated risk is justified and may choose to accept that risk. The adequacy of information must be considered from both sides since the enemy commander will not know everything concerning the units opposing him. The presence of a unit in an unexplained location, fighting under conditions which do not make sense to him, may cause the enemy considerable apprehension. The longer the enemy is kept off balance and the longer we cause him to hesitate, the greater will be the chance of avoiding a situation dangerous to us. This point is well illustrated by an example which occurred near Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. In this situation, one rifle company, holding a roadblock outside the main perimeter, delayed 2 German divisions for almost 2 days. German

reports studied later brought out the fact that their division commanders were confused by the presence of an American unit in the area. This caused them to halt their attack temporarily to study the situation more thoroughly. When the attack was resumed, the rifle company had gone—withdrawn back into the main perimeter—its mission accomplished. This calculated risk paid off handsomely by temporarily confusing the enemy and disrupting an important attack, thus allowing our forces valuable time to prepare additional defenses.

- (2) Time is also a factor necessary for a successful defense. Since the situation which causes a unit to be isolated is usually one in which the enemy has superior strength, sufficient time for preparation of an adequate defense is important. It will be necessary to regroup and reorganize the remaining forces in order to take up positions permitting all round defense rather than strength oriented in the direction of the enemy. Equipment, food, and ammunition must be redistributed.
- (3) Another important requirement for a continued defense of an isolated position is the adequacy of supply. Even the strongest organization of the position, coupled with a fierce determination to resist, may not be sufficient when food and ammunition run out. Thus, the level of supply and the

likelihood of resupply are among the first factors to be considered in selecting this course of action. In a crisis such as this, the unit's combat potential at that moment is also important. Since the unit must fight without replacements, such factors as the number of casualties, general physical condition, and morale must be taken into account.

## **18. Breakout to Areas Under Friendly Control**

*a.* A second way to avoid capture or destruction is to break out to friendly territory. American military history contains many examples of units and individuals fighting their way to friendly territory after being surrounded and isolated. Many other similar cases have gone unnoticed simply because the units or individuals returned safely and continued the battle in the role for which they were trained. One such case involved an isolated infantry battalion. The battalion commander, though realizing that the situation was grave, refused to accept it as hopeless. Having determined that his unit could extricate itself by initiating offensive action, he quickly conceived a simple effective plan to break out of the enemy trap. A rapid reconnaissance verified and added to his previous knowledge and information and enabled him to promptly locate enemy positions and choose the best avenue of escape. His actual breakout attack was coordinated with a well-planned feint along the most logical avenue for his escape. The battalion was able not only to rejoin its parent unit, but also to destroy all ammunition and equipment that could not be

evacuated.

*b.* Successful breakout depends largely upon leaders or individuals who—

- (1) Act rapidly and skillfully to determine enemy weaknesses and strengths.
- (2) Know and thoroughly appreciate the terrain and how best to use it.
- (3) Choose a simple, well-thought-out plan, using a route and a time best calculated to catch the enemy off guard.

*c.* If successful breakout action is to be achieved, strong immediate leadership combined with a will to resist must be present in every man. The leader or individual selecting this course of action has the following factors in his favor:

- (1) The enemy's information as to the strength and combat potential of the isolated unit is no better than the leader's own information about the enemy. This can be turned into an advantage if the breakout is planned and executed rapidly. Speed is essential. The enemy commander probably will not mass his force to destroy the isolated unit until he learns more about the situation. The longer the breakout is delayed, the greater the advantage of the enemy.
- (2) An isolated unit making its way toward friendly lines often begins its movement through the enemy's rear, which is usually vulnerable, being frequently composed of service personnel less alert and without the weapons of combat troops.
- (3) The enemy's intelligence effort is

normally directed at gaining information on activity along its front rather than on the operation of a unit isolated behind its own lines. This fact allows the isolated unit commander or the individual a certain freedom of action. He may capitalize on this by using bold and possibly unorthodox tactics and techniques to accomplish a breakout.

## **19. Evasion by Infiltration**

*a.* When elements of a unit are separated or small units or groups are cut off or otherwise isolated, evasion through infiltration may provide the best means for returning to areas under friendly control. However, the leader or individual should not choose this course of action before first considering other alternatives.

*b.* Evasion by infiltration requires a high degree of training, aggressiveness, common sense, and good physical condition. The tactics and techniques used by reconnaissance patrols or other special mission personnel behind enemy lines apply equally as well to evasion by infiltration. However, the individual or evading group has many advantages over reconnaissance patrols or other special mission groups. Among these are the following:

- (1) You do not have a time schedule; consequently, you have a certain freedom not enjoyed by the patrol that must complete its mission by a given time. This enables you to select a route wisely and allows you time for infiltration.

- (2) Unlike certain types of patrols, you do not have to fight. On the contrary, successful infiltration demands avoidance of armed encounters or contacts of any kind if possible.
- (3) No one is depending on you to accomplish a portion of the larger battle plan. Thus, you can use time and local conditions to your advantage.

*c.* Successful evasion by infiltration depends largely upon detailed planning, patience, and careful execution in which stealth and deception are essential. During World War II and in Korea, a vast majority of those taken prisoner were captured while in groups. The larger the group, the greater the chance of, detection and eventual capture. In most cases, Americans were not taken prisoner while alone. If alone at the time of isolation and confronted by a superior force, leave the immediate area rapidly for a hiding spot out of the path of the enemy advance. If possible, remain there until you collect your thoughts and make plans. When you lose contact with your squad or platoon, it is normal to experience a feeling of helplessness. Training in evasion techniques prepares you for such a situation and helps you to avoid panic and unnecessary surrender. If you are well briefed on evasion tactics, you will tend to react automatically to the situation, knowing that you must quickly decide upon and carry out a plan for avoiding capture.

*d.* Infiltration, like other military operations, must be carefully planned and cautiously executed if success is to be achieved. It is not possible to

set forth here all of the factors to be considered when making a plan for infiltration because the plan must be based on conditions found in a specific area at a specific time. First, make a very careful estimate of the situation based upon an assessment of all known factors that might affect the infiltration. All members of the group should contribute to formulating a plan, and once approved, they should support it in both letter and spirit. Some of the factors to be considered in preparing a plan are: present location; direction and distance to friendly lines; disposition and movement of the enemy; terrain to be crossed and obstacles, both manmade and natural; weather and visibility; and capabilities and limitations of the evaders.

(1) *Present Location.* Generally, groups or individuals will be oriented in relation to their present position and friendly lines. Key NCO's and officers will usually have a tactical map of the area of operations and will be able to accurately locate their position. This, coupled with a previous knowledge of battle plans and information concerning enemy probable courses of action, will enable you to determine the approximate distance and direction to enemy lines.

(2) *Disposition and movement of the enemy.* If you are well trained in cover and concealment and observation, you can select a vantage point from which to observe enemy movements without being detected. By observing the type of enemy

units in the area and their movements, you can determine how anti in what direction the battle is progressing. The forward displacement of artillery, among other factors, indicates that the enemy is still moving forward. Through careful observation of the enemy, it is possible to plan infiltration at a time and place best calculated to surprise him and to proceed undetected.

- (3) *Terrain and obstacles.* If you traveled over the area while it was under friendly control, you may be familiar with the terrain and cultural features and will be able, especially if you have a map, to take advantage of its favorable aspects when planning an infiltration route. If the battle position has become stabilized, manmade obstacles such as minefields and defensive wire must be taken into account. Approximate locations of these obstacles can be determined by studying the terrain and locating topographical features where the enemy would most likely install wire or a minefield. Avoid natural obstacles such as cliffs and wide streams. After carefully evaluating all factors, choose a route which requires a minimum amount of physical exertion and yet avoids enemy strong points and installations. This does not mean that the easy way is the best way. Moving along ridgelines is not advisable. For obvious reasons, avoid bridges, roads, and towns.
- (4) *Weather and visibility.* Your strongest



ally is darkness or periods of limited visibility. If the enemy has poor visibility, the possibility of capture is reduced. The best time to travel is when the enemy is the least alert. Rain and snow storms limit his visibility and cause otherwise alert sentries to seek shelter. Generally, you should travel only at night, preferably after midnight when security personnel are the least alert. However, once you get close to the forward battle position and the front lines move only during periods right after sunset or before sunrise when it is light enough to avoid enemy installations, minefields, and personnel, yet dark enough to prevent detection.

- (5) Capabilities and limitations of the evaders. There are many conditions that will affect the capabilities of evasion groups or individuals. Perhaps the most important of these factors is physical condition; isolation is often accompanied by wounds or exhaustion. Physical condition, morale, and supply levels all play important roles in planning an infiltration.

*e.* The small unit should be separated into small evasion groups with not more than four men in each group. This small organization reduces the chances of enemy detection, facilitates movement and control, and fosters confidence through the use of the "buddy system." The leaders of these groups should be officers or noncommissioned officers of

the unit. In their absence, the unit commander should appoint leader. Three keys to a successful evasion are: detailed planning, patience, and cautious execution under strong leadership. Once a leader has been appointed or elected, it is the duty of each member to cooperate fully with his evasion plan. It bears repeating that the evasion area is merely an extension of the battlefield. The established principles of command remain in effect, only here they become even more important because the unit is completely alone in enemy territory.

## **20. Deeper Penetration To Conduct Guerilla Operations**

Deeper penetration into enemy territory by the isolated unit while conducting guerilla operations is an aggressive course of action that may seem to conflict with the purpose of avoiding capture. Actually, however, penetration offers advantages which make it practical in some situations.

*a.* Communist military practices stress the principle of offensive action. Normally, their attacks are launched only when they have a superiority of more than four to one. They generally employ these superior numbers in successive waves with the objective of completely rupturing the enemy's defensive position. In most cases, encirclement and subsequent annihilation is their immediate objective. These offensive tactics create conditions favorable to an isolated unit that chooses deeper penetration to avoid capture. The communist preference for the tactic of encirclement increases the probability that some units opposing them will be isolated. Since

annihilation is the final aim, it is apparent that in certain situations the most effective way to escape is to move farther into enemy territory.

*b.* The very degree of concentration of force which the enemy needs to rupture the battle position tends to favor the tactic of deeper penetration by the isolated element. The attacker's mass and momentum generally carries the bulk of the enemy force to the rear of the isolated unit. It is likely that a unit penetrating deeper into what has suddenly become the enemy's rear elements will find these areas lightly manned and in most cases occupied only by service or support troops.

*c.* Considering the highly fluid conditions which will probably exist on the battlefields of the future due to nuclear warfare and through other changes in weapons, it is conceivable that there will be times when offensive penetration may be preferable to evasion. Small units cut off from friendly troops will sometimes be ideally situated for inflicting serious damage in the enemy's rear or for liberating allied prisoners who may have been captured and not yet moved deep into enemy territory.

*d.* The leader choosing this alternative needs a broad knowledge of guerilla operations. He must be able to select an operating area that offers suitable prospects for concealment, living off the land, and avoiding contact with strong enemy elements. He must be alert to exploit every opportunity for offensive action such as destroying lines of communication, attacking large headquarters, collecting information, and

other harassing or disruptive action.

*e.* The success of any action requiring the isolated group or unit to continue operations as an offensive combat force depends primarily on leadership. Every soldier in the unit must have reason to believe that deeper penetration offers the best chance for survival. He must be convinced that further combat deep in enemy territory is not merely a futile gesture. He should be aware, for example, that if the unit can fight its way to a weakly held area, evacuation by air, water, or some other method may be possible.

*f.* Military training and instruction should teach that behind-the-line operations be regarded merely as an extension of a phase of combat operations, and in fluid, fast-moving warfare, a rather common phase.

*g.* Isolated units must make continuing efforts to retain or regain communications with friendly units, including those in areas under friendly control as well as other isolated groups. When isolated groups contact one another, they may either join forces or, if it is more advantageous, remain separated but coordinate their actions and movements.

*h.* The possibility may exist for units deep in enemy territory to link up with organized guerillas or dissident indigenous groups. This possibility involves great risks, however, and should not be attempted without dependable information concerning the local situation. An attempted linkup, if unsuccessful, could expose

underground resistance groups for whom secrecy is vital. It is also possible that guerillas or other dissident groups in enemy territory may be hostile to our own forces or, at best, uncooperative. These and other possible ramifications must be considered by the leaders of a unit contemplating penetration with a view toward making such a contact.

*i.* Communist armies have frequently used regular forces to remain in place until an enemy offensive has swept past their positions, then continued the fighting in the enemy's rear. Usually these troops have demonstrated their thorough knowledge of the area of operations. Yet even when penetrating unfamiliar territory, the isolated unit has an excellent chance to survive while inflicting heavy damage on the enemy. This is largely because some of the conditions favorable to successful guerilla action-freedom in choice of target, surprise, local superiority, laxness of rear area troops-rest with the isolated units as long as a fluid front remains in existence.

*j.* It is emphasized that deeper penetration is primarily a short-term operation; its purpose should not be confused with the mission or activities of special forces. However, an alert and well-trained isolated unit often can exploit its situation to the extent of engaging in comparatively sustained operations behind enemy lines.

## **21. Adapting Plan to Changing Situation**

*a.* The final course of action consists of

combining, according to the particular situation, any of the alternatives already discussed. In, some situations, one technique by itself may not be enough. The determined and resourceful leader, by combining several alternatives, may thus improvise the best means of remaining free and operational.

*b.* In most situations, the leader will not be able initially to devise a plan that takes into account every possibility affecting the escape of his unit. The situation will change, often rapidly. Thus, the ability to adopt a new alternative and seize new opportunities without delay is the key to success in operations of this nature. This is well illustrated by the case of an infantry division during the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944. Scattered elements of the division, numbering several hundred men over which a determined and resourceful officer had assumed command, set up a defense to hold their isolated position. The group held as a single force as long as possible. When it became obvious that this method of defense could not succeed, the commander divided the force into small groups and ordered them to make their way back to allied lines. Most of the groups were successful. The leader had first taken one course of action, and when this proved not to be the best choice, he quickly turned to one that was better suited to the immediate situation.

## **22. Unlimited Alternatives**

The courses of action listed above should not be, considered as covering all actions that can be taken to avoid capture. Any, action is justified so

long as it does not violate the Geneva Convention. Misusing the distinctive Red Cross emblem to protect personnel or material not entitled to such protection is an example of such a violation. The point to keep in mind is that there are numerous alternatives open to would-be evaders. Anyone threatened with capture is duty bound to exhaust all possibilities before allowing himself to become a prisoner.

## **23. Factors Influencing a Course of Action**

Courses of action to follow in a particular situation can be decided only after you determine the answers to several questions.

*a.* First you must ask: "Are we really isolated?" Many experienced combat soldiers have at one time or another believed themselves cut off when in reality they were not. Many battlefield conditions can create this illusion. The infiltration of small enemy forces, the difficulties caused by darkness and poor visibility, the normal confusion of battle, or inadequate information about the enemy-all can momentarily give even the most battle-wise leader an impression that he is surrounded. This is why it is so important for you to make every effort to ascertain your actual situation. For you to break up your unit into smaller groups to infiltrate to safety or to take any other action based on imagined isolation can easily lead to disaster. Skillful reconnaissance and accurate interpretation and evaluation of available information will do much to determine whether or

not the unit is really isolated.

*b.* Another question involves the degree to which communications are necessary. Usually, the decision to take action to avoid capture does not depend upon being in contact or gaining contact with friendly elements. Obviously, if an exchange of information with headquarters or other friendly forces is possible, you can select your course more accurately. If you have communications, you can more readily judge the possibility of relief, determine the availability of supply, or complete your picture of both the friendly and enemy situations. Without communications, you must use every other possible means to obtain the information you need in order to decide on the best course of action.

*c.* Another important question is: "Do I have control of the group?" The answer to this question may depend on communication and will directly affect the alternative you may select. If the situation makes control unduly difficult, you may decide that the best course is to release small groups to find their way to safety. If control can be maintained or established, you may decide to adopt an alternative that features integrated group action.

*d.* A question of utmost importance is this: "To what extent do casualties affect my course of action?" The presence of even a few casualties has sometimes been given as the reason for immobilizing a large unit and eventually causing it to be captured. On the other hand, isolated units with a high percentage of casualties have frequently disdained surrender and avoided



capture. This question has many moral, psychological, and practical implications that require considerable attention. Any policy which envisions the routine abandonment of casualties is reprehensible and would be damaging to morale and combat efficiency. Casualties must be cared for and evacuated whenever possible. It is pointed out, however, that under certain conditions, combat effective men who remain with the wounded may well jeopardize not only the wounded and themselves, but also the unit as a whole. Situations will no doubt arise in which casualties cannot be evacuated; in such a case, supplies, and if possible, medical or other military personnel, should be left behind with the wounded.

# CHAPTER 4

## LONG RANGE EVASION

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### Section I. REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESS

#### 24. Problems of the Evader

*a.* This chapter covers evasion and survival principles, procedures, and techniques which, if followed, will assist you to avoid capture while evading far behind enemy lines. Army personnel coming within this category are usually escaped prisoners of war; however, the techniques as presented here are applicable to individual's who, for any reason, find themselves far behind enemy lines.

*b.* As pointed out in paragraph 12, it is not feasible to define in terms of time or distance where short range evasion ends and long range evasion begins. The difference lies in such conditions as the deployment of enemy forces, to include security and police elements, travel restrictions, and presence or absence of civilian population. All of these factors influence the selection of a course of action as well as the techniques that must be employed to avoid capture. It must also be remembered that the long-range evader, if an escapee, is usually in poor physical condition following his stay in a communist POW camp and has little or no food or equipment to assist him in returning to areas under friendly control. He must fend for himself by living off the land if possible or, as a last resort, by seeking assistance from natives.

## **25. Requirements of Evasion**

Evasion in enemy territory must necessarily involve risk. A great deal of care, thought, and self-control are required to outwit an enemy who has the advantage of knowing his own ground. Despite the difficulties, long-range evasion has been and can be successful. If you are cut off from your unit or if you have escaped from custody, you may have to travel hundreds of difficult miles before contacting friendly assistance or regaining friendly lines. It is essential, therefore, that Army personnel be thoroughly indoctrinated in the principles of long range evasion and acquire the basic skills required for survival in the open over extended periods. (See FM 21-76 for information on living off the land.) It is also essential that they acquire background knowledge of appropriate foreign countries, to include topography, language, population and customs, communications and transportation systems, and internal affairs.

## **Section II. THE WILL TO SURVIVE AND EVADE**

### **26. Importance of Will to Survive**

The will to survive, coupled with your ability to withstand hardships and overcome obstacles, is the key to successful long-range evasion. This "will to survive" is not a mysterious force beyond human understanding, but is something that you can maintain by sheer willpower. When you find yourself in an evasion and survival situation, you should recognize the fact that many obstacles to be

overcome are mental rather than physical. Wherever you may be, remember that other people have gone there intentionally, and that some people have chosen to live there. With varying degrees of effort, these people have adjusted to the demands of the terrain, climate, and environment. Your problem is somewhat different only because you did not expect to be there. Psychologists say that most "will-to-survive" behavior includes *continued adaptive behavior and successful control of internal tension*. They conclude that: "Failure to survive, because of a loss of will to do so, may be considered either a setting in of apathy or the arousal of extreme panic." As a result of either reaction, you become unwilling or unable to deal with new crises.

## 27. Maintaining the Will To Survive

a. Among the factors and conditions that help to maintain the will to survive are—

- (1) *Planning*. Survey the situation, formulate plans, and make the best use of available resources.
- (2) *Action*. Take the action necessary to survive and evade. Take advantage of the situation by avoiding detection, finding food and shelter, etc.
- (3) *Effort*. Maintain your will and survive as a result of sheer effort. This behavior may be described 'as effort and determination even under the most trying circumstances.
- (4) *Training*. Survival and evasion training, your own experience, common sense, and knowledge of basic skills all help to prepare you for the evasion situation.
- (5) *Control of panic*. Maintain your self-

control and refuse to allow yourself to panic.

- (6) *Group integrity.* When in a group, maintain the will to survive as a result of the presence of other individuals, group cooperation, or group solidarity, which is a pact among members of the group.
- (7) *Group leadership.* Some form of strong, forceful leadership contributes to maintaining the will to survive.
- (8) *Stronger helps the weaker.* In a group, support those who have a tendency to give up. Help to bring them through by encouraging them, calming their fears, and persuading them to take the necessary action to survive and evade.
- (9) *Mutual support.* The company of one or more people is a stabilizing, calming influence, which instills confidence through the "buddy system."
- (10) *Patience.* Be patient and willing to wait to "sweat it out."
- (11) *Endurance.* You must be able to endure pain, discomfort, or other unpleasant conditions. Keep yourself in as good physical condition as possible to maintain your stamina.
- (12) *Release of emotions.* Release pent-up emotions and tensions through an out burst or violent activity. As a result, you will

become calm and able to solve the survival problem.

- (13) *Sense of responsibility.* Your will to survive is sustained by a strong sense of responsibility, loyalty to your country, and military duty.
- (14) *Religious faith.* Your will to survive is maintained by faith in a God and through prayer.
- (15) *Family and home ties.* Your desire to return to home and family is a primary motivating factor in the will to survive.
- (16) *Hate and revenge.* Will to survive is often nurtured by hatred of the enemy and a desire for revenge.

b. Among the most important factors that contribute to the loss of will to survive and evade are—

- (1) *Lack of survival and evasion training.* If you have had little or no survival training, you will lack survival and evasion knowledge or some basic skill, or will not know what to do.
- (2) *Failure to plan.* You fail to survey the situation, to plan your behavior and evasion route, or to use the available means of survival.
- (3) *Panic.* You become irrational, frantic, and disorganized.
- (4) *Inaction.* You do nothing; you fail to take action necessary for survival because of fear, carelessness, or laziness.

- (5) *Loneliness*. You are overcome by a feeling of helplessness and loneliness, resulting in panic, overwhelming fear, etc.
- (6) *Low self-esteem*. You lack confidence, lose self-respect, feel unworthy, and are overcome by a feeling of guilt.
- (7) *Lack of teamwork*. There is a lack of teamwork, or even rivalry and dissension among the evaders; the effect is demoralizing.
- (8) *Prolonged exposure*. You lose your will to survive as a result of prolonged exposure to heat, cold, thirst, hunger, etc.
- (9) *Insurmountable difficulty*. If you face a difficulty that appears impossible to overcome (weather, injury or sickness, lack of food), you may lose the will to survive.
- (10) *Inability to endure*. You lack stamina, are in poor physical condition, unable to tolerate pain, thirst, discomfort, hunger, etc. You may become unconscious or fall asleep exhausted.
- (11) *Impatience*. You lose the will to survive as a result of impatience or inability to "sweat it out."
- (12) *Hysteria*. You "go berserk" or become hysterical. Hysteria refers to a sharp breakdown rather than disorganized behavior as in panic. You are "out of your mind" and have lost control completely.

- (13) *Lack of religious faith.* Loss of will to survive can sometimes be traced to a lack of faith in God and the power of prayer.

## **28. Overcoming Obstacles**

It is impossible to survive and evade over long periods in the open or to overcome obstacles unless you have psychologically prepared yourself for the worst. You are convinced that you can and will survive, whatever the odds, and return to friendly control. You have accepted the evasion area as an extension of the battlefield and will not give up the fight as long as you have the means to resist.

## **Section III. PLANNING FOR LONG RANGE EVASION**

### **29. Plan Evasion and Escape Together**

*a.* As an escaped prisoner of war, you should have planned for at least the early phases of long-range evasion concurrently with your escape planning. The scope and extent of the evasion plan as conceived while still in custody varies with the amount and type of information available to you about the enemy population and the evasion area. Information available to escape committees or the individual POW may range from no information to complete information giving details on enemy security measures, check points, travel restrictions, and customs of the people. In some instances, maps of the area have been obtained. A total lack of information usually reflects the nonexistence or inefficiency of an organized escape committee. Some prisoners have constructed reasonably accurate maps of the evasion



area from the collective knowledge of POW's within the camp and from information received from guard personnel.

*b.* In most cases, recapture of escaped prisoners of war can be attributed largely to the escapees' lack of information concerning security measures employed by the enemy immediately outside of the camp. It is therefore essential that you carefully plan the initial phases of long-range evasion in the POW camp. You must previously establish your starting point before the escape so that you can move rapidly to it once you clear the POW camp. Select alternate starting points in the event enemy action prevents the use of the principal one. If several prisoners are escaping, these SP's (starting points) may serve as rallying points where they could meet to collect their thoughts and plan for the next phase of evasion. Locate the starting point or rallying point sufficiently far from the camp to avoid the security cordon usually established around the camp following escape alerts. A well-organized escape committee can usually, by distracting guard personnel, insure that escaping personnel have at least a few hours before their escape is detected.

### **30. Available Courses of Action**

Courses of action which you or the evasion group operating far behind enemy lines may select are as follows:

- a.* Evasion by infiltration.
- b.* Evasion by deception.
- c.* Conduct of guerilla type operations.

*d.* Combination of any of the above.

### **31. Evasion by Infiltration**

*a.* Studies show that infiltration is the most successful course of action for the individual or small group evading far behind enemy lines. If possible you should complete the entire journey to friendly lines or neutral areas without contacting natives for assistance of any kind. This means that you must live off of the land and complete the entire trip by foot, which may cover hundreds of miles and take several months. Under some circumstances, especially in areas such as the arctic and desert regions of the world, it may become necessary for you to seek assistance from natives in order to survive. Methods of contacting them are covered in paragraphs 44 through 46.

*b.* Infiltration as a tactic contemplates moving through enemy territory without detection. To accomplish this, it is best to travel in small groups with from 2 to 4 men in each group. As in short-range evasion, when there are more than 2 individuals in a group, the ranking officer or noncommissioned officer assumes command. Once a course of action has been decided upon, it is the duty of each individual to cooperate and make it successful.

### **32. Evasion by Deception**

This alternative may well be the only practical course of action open. In many parts of the world it is impossible to travel without coming into contact with civilians, especially in the Asiatic countries. Evasion by deception under these circumstances is

mandatory. It contemplates the use of disguise and cover stories explaining your presence in the area. As an evasion tactic, deception is perhaps the most difficult. In European countries it is obviously more successful than in Asiatic countries because of marked differences in facial features, language, and customs.

### **33. Guerilla Type Operations**

This alternative is not considered practical for individuals or small evasion groups because of the minor damage they are capable of inflicting upon an enemy of superior force. However, this does not preclude it as a possible course of action. If the individual or leader decides that he can successfully wage unconventional warfare against the enemy, then he should employ guerilla tactics. For a discussion of this subject as a possible course of action, see paragraph 20.

### **34. Combination of Courses**

Circumstances may make it necessary for you to adopt various tactics combining several courses of action. The first phase of evasion may be made without assistance of any kind and employing infiltration tactics and living off the land, while later phases may necessitate the use of deception when passing through populated areas. Under certain circumstances, your group may find it advantageous to employ hit-and-run guerilla tactics, especially on enemy supply installations where there is food or other items that would assist during the evasion. Weigh all factors before reaching a decision as to a

specific course of action.

### **35. Planning**

Planning for long-range evasion, whether accomplished in the POW camp or following escape, must be as detailed as knowledge of the enemy situation will permit. Planning must be continuous and flexible to meet new and unforeseen circumstances. For factors to be considered during evasion planning see chapter 3.

### **36. Collecting Enemy Information**

By virtue of your military background and training, intelligence officers rate you as a very reliable source of information. However, any information you collect is considered a byproduct of evasion activities behind enemy lines. Do not under any circumstance jeopardize personal safety or compromise cover for the express purpose of collecting information. Do, however, observe and memorize in as much detail as possible enemy strength, equipment, location, disposition, organization, and movement or the common factors of Order of Battle intelligence. Do not under any circumstance record anything in writing. Such information found on your person is sufficient to convict you of espionage.

### **37. Sabotage**

Unless you are a member of an evasion group that has elected to remain behind enemy lines to fight the enemy using guerilla tactics; you should not commit acts of sabotage. Such activity delays your return to friendly control and jeopardizes your status as a prisoner of war, if captured.

## **Section IV. TRAVEL**

### **38. Obstacles to Travel**

*a.* Before returning to friendly control, you may be confronted with many obstacles which impede evasion effort and influence your selected routes. These obstacles can be divided into natural obstacles, such as the weather and terrain, and human obstacles, such as travel restrictions and the entire enemy security apparatus designed for population control. Movements within certain areas may be restricted to certain individuals who have adequate documents or identity papers. Travel may be restricted to certain daylight hours and to designated routes. In the communist police state, it is extremely difficult for the untrained traveler to overcome these physical security barriers. It is for this reason that emphasis in this manual is placed upon cross-country, unaided movement during the evasion.

*b.* In a geographic area or country where you may reasonably pass as a native, your chances of avoiding detection are good. But by and large these conditions seldom favor the American soldier except perhaps in Western Europe; therefore, it is imperative that as a potential long-range evader you be capable of traveling great distances cross-country and of surviving the effects of natural obstacles.

### **39. Initial Orientation**

Locate your position with relation to your destination. The destination may be friendly lines, neutral countries, areas containing people known to

be sympathetic toward Americans, or areas where active escape organizations are believed to exist for the purpose of assisting evaders (see FM 31-21 and FM 31-21A). This initial orientation must be accomplished before you can possibly hope to continue your travels. Many cases have been cited where successful escapes have been accomplished only to end in recapture merely because the escapees were not able to orient themselves after leaving the camp and traveled in circles for the first few hours of their freedom. When daylight came, they were usually back near the point from which they had started. If for any reason you are unable to determine the general direction to your planned destination, remain in hiding until you are able to do so. General direction may be determined by observing the movement of enemy military forces or supplies, or as a last resort, through questioning a native. Once a general direction has been established, you must have a means of following it. First orient yourself in relation to north, south, east, and west.

*a. Sun.* In the northern hemisphere, the sun is slightly toward the south at noon. If you face the sun at noon, you will be facing south. If you are fortunate enough to have retained your pocket watch or wrist watch, you may make even more accurate calculations. Position of the sun at noon and resultant shadow is dependent upon seasonal changes as well as zones. Use of the watch to determine the direction of north is also dependent upon the zone in which one is located. (For examples of differences in use of the watch as to position on the earth's surface, see FM 21-26.) In the northern hemisphere, the watch, set on local

sun time, should be held flat in the hand with the hour hand pointing in the direction of the sun. Midway between the hour hand and 1200 hours will be the direction south. In the southern hemisphere, all directions noted above are opposite.

*b. Stars.* In keeping with the established principle of traveling at night, it becomes necessary for you to navigate at night. The stars provide a good means for guiding and keeping on the right route during hours of darkness.

- (1) In the northern hemisphere, locate the Big Dipper. If you can find the Big Dipper, use as pointers the two stars that form the side of the cup farthest from the handle. These point in the direction toward which you would pour from the dipper. The pointers aim at a fairly bright star which is about five times the distance between the stars of the dipper cup. This distinctive star is the North Star and it is directly over the North Pole. If you hold a finger away from your eyes so that it just fits between the two points and then, keeping your hand the same distance from your eyes, measure five finger widths away from the end of the pointer, your farthest finger will just touch the North Star.

- (2) Sometimes, however, you cannot see the Big Dipper although you may be able to see other stars. In that event you use a star pattern called the Big W or the Big M (Cassiopeia). The North Star is

straight out from the point of the W about the same distance as from the Big Dipper.

- (3) On a clear night, you will be able to see the Big Dipper or the Big W. Sometimes you will be able to see both. By using either of them, you will be able to find the North Star. See FM 21-26 and FM 21-75.

## 40. Cross-Country Travel

Traveling cross-country enables you to avoid most human obstacles such as enemy checkpoints, roving patrols, or local police. The cross-country evasion route must avoid major roads and populated areas of all types, even at the expense of additional time and distance used in skirting such areas. As a general rule, the longest route between two evasion march objectives is the safest route. Many evaders have been captured merely because they followed the easiest and shortest route.

*a. Cover and Concealment.* Make full use of cover (ditches, hollows, embankments, and folds in the ground) and concealment (trees, bushes, grass, and log piles). Use concealed routes when possible and move rapidly when crossing exposed areas. This is in keeping with the principle: "If the enemy can't see you, he can't capture you."

*b. Roads.* In remote areas, it may be both safe and advantageous to follow unimproved roads that are seldom traveled. If you walk along the road, be constantly alert to avoid crossroads and



junctions; conceal yourself off the road upon the approach of enemy personnel. It may be advisable to use the road as a guide while you travel a route parallel to it.

*c. Ridges.* Whether you choose to travel on ridges below the crestline or along valleys or streams on existing routes will be determined by the situation and the nature of the terrain. In remote areas, it is sometimes permissible to use wooded ridgelines to make travel easier. However, it is seldom wise to travel on exposed crests since you will be silhouetted against the sky' and can be seen for considerable distances. In selecting 'a route, avoid silhouetting yourself against any contrasting background such as the sky, extremely light foliage, or a snow bank. Generally, it is best to travel along the middle third of a ridgeline, thereby avoiding well-established routes along the bottom and top of the ridge. In forward combat areas, troops usually occupy high ground.

*d. Streams and Valleys.* Following a stream generally requires fording, detouring, and penetrating thick vegetation. In mountainous country, travel may be impeded along the stream by waterfalls, cliffs, and tributary valleys. In flat country, there are the following disadvantages streams tend to meander, vegetation may be dense, observation points rare, and swamps common. Even so, following a stream presents some advantages, for it provides a comparatively definite course. Also, rivers and streams are a source of food, water, anal a possible means of travel by boat or raft.

*e. Cliffs and Slopes.* Choose a route that appears to offer handholds and footholds, cracks, and ledges in an unbroken path from, top to bottom. Test every hold carefully before trusting your weight to it. Distribute your weight over two or more spots, particularly when traversing loose rock. If the slope is of fine material, turn slightly sideways in descending, keep your joints loose, take a diagonal course, and use long steps or jumps. If the slope is of coarse material or large rocks, descend more carefully because the loose rocks might roll under your weight. Since rock falls are frequent in rugged country, avoid traveling at the base of cliffs or slopes.

*f. Mountains.* Mountainous and deeply eroded terrain presents special difficulties. What appears as a single ridge from a distance may prove to be numerous ridges and valleys, all of which must be crossed to reach the main ridge. It is generally wiser to move parallel to ridges and valleys rather than at right angles to them.

*g. Night Travel.* When far behind enemy lines, travel only at night, preferably after midnight. When close to the front lines, move right after sunset or just before sunrise when it is sufficiently light to enable you to avoid enemy installations and minefields, and yet dark enough to prevent recognition by the enemy.

## **41. Travel Tips While Evading Cross-Country**

*a.* Be patient, cautious, and avoid overconfidence. An enemy approach is no cause for panic. Normally, the chances of remaining unobserved are good.

b. Conserve your strength by avoiding exhaustion if at all possible. When compelled to remain in one place for an extended period, exercise moderately in order to keep fit.

c. Generally avoid eating uncooked food or drinking unboiled water. Select a hiding spot and cook the food and boil the water which is to be used en route to the next evasion objective.

d. Retain items of personal clothing and equipment which serve a useful purpose during survival and evasion. Keep some item which will identify you as an American soldier, such as identification tags. If you are not able to positively identify yourself as an American soldier, you may be treated as a spy if captured or be refused assistance by escape organizations or friendly natives.

e. Do not leave or cast away any articles which, if found, would serve to reveal your presence or the fact that you had been at a certain point. Bury or otherwise dispose of the effects of your campsite, which could give the enemy a clear picture as to your direction of travel.

f. *Practice supply economy.* The same coat or pair of shoes may have to be used throughout the entire evasion trip, which may cover hundreds of cross-country miles during both winter and summer seasons. Build up your food and water supplies and carefully ration them so that they will last until you can reach an evasion objective and replenish them.

g. Use firearms only in emergency and keep them concealed at all times during the evasion,

unless a situation arises which requires a show of arms.

## **42. Travel in Populated Areas**

*a.* Evasion in thickly populated areas requires deception. There are a number of factors to consider before attempting this course of action. First, carefully evaluate the answers to several critical questions.

- (1) Can I, with my facial characteristics, pass as a native?
- (2) Is my language dialect acceptable?
- (3) Are my credentials and clothing acceptable in this village or town?
- (4) Do I have sufficient money of the type used in this area?
- (5) Is my cover story, explaining my presence in the village, plausible? Will it stand up under local police examination? Under trained counterintelligence interrogation?

*b.* If you can answer yes to the above questions, you stand a good chance of evading through deception. The American soldier is not generally equipped with an intimate knowledge of the customs, language, and activities of a foreign country required for this type of covert activity. But if you are, this method offers the fastest possible evasion route.

## **43. Hints for the Evader**

*a.* Military controls will be imposed on all territories occupied by the enemy and travel and

identification papers will be subjected to close scrutiny. Nevertheless, the initial imposition of such controls is generally attended with so much confusion and chaos that ideal conditions for evasion will exist for some time. Not only were there thousands of Americans, British, and other allied personnel who successfully evaded capture in occupied countries during World War II, but there were cases where Russian pilots shot down over Germany evaded capture for years and returned to Russia after the war.

*b.* In general, in those parts of Russia which the Germans occupied during World War II, most natives were too terrified to help evaders. First, even the natives who welcomed the German occupiers were treated so cruelly that they learned to distrust the motives of "foreigners"; and second, when the Soviets returned, they ruthlessly exterminated all who had collaborated with the Germans. Consequently, you would do well to avoid areas in Russia which were occupied by the Germans during World War II.

*c.* Numerous dissident peasants can be found in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. These farmers, resenting efforts by Russia to impose collectivization on them but unable to revolt openly, often welcome the opportunity to aid those opposed to the Soviet regime.

*d.* Natives of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have a heritage of resistance to Russian rule; those old enough to have tasted independence and liberty between the two World Wars should be

particularly friendly.

*e.* In the pre-Carpathian region of the Ukraine, a strong nationalist movement existed during and after World War II. Because Ukrainian Nationalists welcomed the German invaders, the Russians, upon reoccupation; ruthlessly broke up and relocated members of organized nationalist groups. Nevertheless, individual opponents of collectivization may still be found who will conceal and otherwise assist you.

*f.* In the Crimea and the Caucasus, wholesale relocation of natives opposing Soviet policies or having nationalistic desires has so terrified the present inhabitants that little sympathy or aid may be expected.

*g.* Additional hints for evaders in European Russia are

- (1) Board trains only at small stations.
- (2) If unable to speak Russian, either impersonate a shock victim or a deaf and dumb person.
- (3) Russian funds are helpful; bribery is widespread.
- (4) Avoid actions which could draw attention to you or be viewed with suspicion by civilians.

*h.* In Manchuria, you may possibly obtain help from Mohammedans who can be distinguished from other Manchurians by their mustaches, the center of which is shaved off. You can recognize Mohammedan areas by their shrines which are always equipped with towers for the worship of the new moon and have the symbol of the crescent

moon. Also, Mohammedan restaurants in Manchuria can be recognized by the pair of *blue-colored* Pa or huge paper tape tassels, about a foot in diameter, hung at the entrances. (Non-Islamites hang *red-colored* tassels in their restaurants.)

*i.* The Taoists in Manchuria may also be a source of help, and they are very powerful. Any shrine or temple of the Taoist religion will provide refuge to any human entering its gates, whether he is an outlaw, criminal, or national enemy.

*j.* Bear in mind that fishermen, with their freedom of movement due to the inability of government agents to keep an eye on them, can move in and out of the country-freely and arrange for the escape of personnel from coastal areas.

*k.* Watches, fountain pens, rings, and similar items may prove to be a source of curious interest to the natives and valuable for barter. The best barter items are clothing, sewing kits, watches, tobacco, pipes, razor blades, soap, and mirrors not the signaling variety. Preferably the barter items should be native or neutral in origin so as not to create suspicion.

## **Section V. NATIVE ASSISTANCE**

### **44. Last Resort**

Avoid people as long as possible. However, if you find that you can no longer hope to proceed on your own because of sickness, lack of food, or for other cogent reasons, then and only then

should you seek native assistance. Assistance may be forthcoming from individual natives who are sympathetic to the allied cause, or from members of the underground who operate escape lines for the purpose of returning evaders to allied control. Exercise great caution when contacting natives, regardless of what they purport to be. If you are fortunate enough to travel through an area where an organized escape line exists, then the chances are good that a spatter will seek you out: Spotters for resistance or underground organizations are particularly alert when they have reason to believe that allied evaders are in their area but this will also apply to the enemy police and counterintelligence agents. Persons wearing civilian clothing in enemy-held territory are not necessarily civilians; many enemy soldiers have been found so attired.

## **45. Making Contact**

*a. Who.* Avoid the young and the rich. Young people are usually thoroughly indoctrinated in communism and the rich are usually government officials. It is safer to contact individuals such as farmers, shepherds, itinerant workers, and isolated travelers. Generally speaking, Christians in communist-dominated countries serve as valuable contacts. There is less risk in contacting laymen and the lower clergy, for many of the higher clergy have communist sympathies. As a general rule, native women are unreliable contacts. However, if you find it necessary to deal with a woman, be courteous and businesslike and terminate your dealings as quickly as possible in favor of a male contact.



*b. Where.* Do not contact natives in a group. Nor is it advisable to make contact in a village or town. Wait until a native is alone, preferably in an isolated area, before approaching him. Natives are not likely to trust one another in a communist-controlled state unless they happen to be very close friends or are associates in resistance work. It may be that a sympathetic native may refuse to give you aid because of the presence of a third person, or from fear that your approach has been witnessed by some unfriendly person. It is best to contact a native around dusk, just after he arises in the morning, while he is working in his field, or while he is traveling along an isolated road.

*c. Procedure.* Once you select a native whom you believe to be sympathetic, be extremely cautious during the first contact. The native may offer food and shelter immediately or he may tell you that you should wait while he goes for help. If the latter is the case, you should agree but move to a concealed point nearby so that you can observe the native as he returns and yet not be observed yourself. This is the crucial point of the contact. If the native, is seen returning with police, you will have an opportunity to escape. If it appears that the native is sincere and has returned with another civilian, you should return with caution to the meeting point for assistance. The native contact, whether he is merely an individual who wants to help an American or a member of an escape line, will require that you show some proof of identity. It is therefore essential that you keep on your person something which will identify you as an American soldier. Spotters from escape lines

have been trained as to methods of identifying allied personnel. They know the type of questions which should be asked in determining the national origin of an individual. The most aid that can be expected from an individual native is food and temporary shelter and general instructions concerning enemy security measures such as travel restrictions and the location of check points. In the event contact is established with a spotter from an escape line, additional assistance will usually be forthcoming.

## **46. Evasion and Escape Lines**

*a. General.* In future wars, it can be expected that there will be certain dissident people who resent communist occupation or domination. From this dissident element of the native population springs active resistance movements. A major function of such movements is the operation of evasion and escape lines for the purpose of returning allied evaders to allied control. These escape lines, or "rat lines" as they are often called, may be very elaborate and efficient organizations, or they may be the combined effort of several individuals. Whatever their origin, they have one thing in common—complete secrecy of operations. They are constantly on guard against their worst enemy—the "plant" or stool pigeon. It is for this reason that you will not be taken directly to the major escape facility. Usually, you will be passed through several cutouts, being checked identity-wise each time, before you reach the real escape organization. This process may take as much as several weeks. You must be patient. Once you decide to trust a native,

cooperate to the fullest and do not hesitate in answering questions concerning identity. Avoid at all costs any discussion of your military unit or your own military history. Also, avoid giving any information concerning the name and location of any person who has previously helped you. If in a bona fide evasion and escape line, you will not be required to give such information.

*b. Type of Assistance.* Well-organized and supported escape lines can normally be expected to provide the following assistance, as required

- (1) Temporary food and shelter, or food and supplies for the next phase of the journey.
- (2) Clothing and credentials acceptable in the area to be traveled.
- (3) Maps, to include information concerning enemy security measures along the evasion route.
- (4) Money and transportation tickets.
- (5) Medical treatment.
- (6) A native guide, if one is available.

*c. Emergency Plan for Escape.* As previously mentioned, once you decide to trust a native, follow his instructions. He is likely to be informed about enemy security measures employed in the evasion area. This does not mean that you should literally place your life into the hands of the native. On the contrary, you must be constantly alert. Have at all times an emergency plan of escape should the native lead you into a trap or should you for any reason come under

enemy suspicion.

*d. Payment.* Generally, organized escape line personnel will not accept money or goods as payment for their services for fear of compromise of their secret organization. You should, however, advise your helpers that at a future date after the war they will be reimbursed by the U. S. government, providing they present a bona fide claim. A word of caution here: you must not at any time write down the names or addresses of your helpers; they should be memorized and revealed only to the U. S. Army intelligence officers authorized to receive such information.

*e.* For additional information on evasion and escape lines, see FM 31-21 and 31-21A.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONTACTING FRIENDLY AND NEUTRAL ELEMENTS**

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#### **Section I. NEED FOR CAUTION**

##### **47. Crucial Phase of Evasion**

Establishing contact with friendly lines or crossing the border to a neutral country is the most crucial point of the evasion. All of the patience, planning, and hardships will have been in vain if you do not exercise even greater caution when contacting friendly frontline forces. Personnel operating behind enemy lines have been killed by friendly outposts while attempting to pass through friendly lines. Evaders have been shot by friendly patrols because they did not identify themselves properly. Great numbers of refugees have been shot by friendly forces while trying to escape to freedom. Most of these deaths could have been avoided if caution had been exercised and a few simple procedures followed. The normal tendency is to throw caution to the winds when in sight of friendly forces. This should be overcome and a very sensitive situation should be recognized.

##### **48. Evader Is Handicapped**

Regular patrols or special mission personnel operating behind enemy lines are given the challenge and password of the day as a security

measure. This provides for the identification of the patrol as it approaches a friendly position. In addition, frontline troops are told the time and place where patrols will leave and enter the lines. These conditions do not exist for the evader unless he is able to rejoin his unit within 24 hours following separation. He must follow certain established procedures and hope that frontline, troops will also follow them.

## **Section II. CONTACTING FRIENDLY FORCES**

### **49. Friendly Patrols**

*a.* After arriving in the combat zone, be constantly on the alert for friendly patrols, for this is the best method of returning to friendly territory. Find a concealed observation point which allows you maximum visual coverage of the battle zone. Attempt to memorize every terrain feature so that if necessary you could infiltrate to friendly positions under the cover of darkness.

*b.* The chances are good that you will be able to contact a friendly patrol. The two general types of patrols, reconnaissance and combat, differ mainly in their mission and actions behind enemy lines. It is important that you be able to recognize the type of patrol, for the mission of the patrol may be the deciding factor in whether or not to attempt contact.

- (1) *Reconnaissance patrol.* A reconnaissance patrol is used to gather information. Normally it avoids enemy contact while en route to the objective;

however, a reconnaissance patrol may fight to accomplish its mission or to protect itself.

- (2) Combat patrol. A combat patrol is just what its name implies. Usually strong and heavily armed, it engages the enemy to destroy or capture personnel, equipment, and installations.
- (3) Extended ground reconnaissance units. In addition to the standard types mentioned above, larger forces called extended ground reconnaissance units may be operating as far as 25 miles behind enemy lines.

## **50. Contact Procedures**

*a.* Because of the mission of reconnaissance and combat patrols, it is obvious that the safest contact is with the reconnaissance patrol. In the event you elect not to establish contact, you can observe their route and approach friendly lines at approximately the same location. This will enable you to avoid minefields and booby traps.

*b.* Once you spot a patrol, it is best to remain in position and allow it to come to you, if possible. When the patrol gets within from 25 to 50 yards of your position, display a white cloth and call out in your best American English, with dialect, a greeting that is clearly and unmistakably of American origin. If the distance is greater than 50 yards, a reconnaissance patrol may avoid contact and skirt your position; if less than 25 yards, a member of the patrol may react instantly

by firing a fatal shot. It is imperative that at the time of contact there is sufficient light for the patrol to identify you as an American.

c. If unable to contact a friendly patrol, you may be in an area where a stream flows toward and through friendly lines. It may be possible for you to swim down the stream into friendly territory. If you select this method, place a log or similar flotation device in the stream in front of you and swim 30 to 50 feet behind it. This log will normally trip any booby traps or mines which might be in the stream. You may be evading along a coastal area and decide to contact friendly lines from the sea. In this case, use a flotation device and float out to sea around the flank of the enemy into friendly territory. If none of these methods of contact are possible, you have but one alternative to make a direct contact with friendly outposts.

## 51. Friendly Outposts

a. *First Contact.* Although Army doctrine favors the capture of the enemy as opposed to annihilation, the mission of delaying action forces and outposts makes it difficult to apply this doctrinal principle. Frontline troops, and especially those employed several miles forward of the forward edge of the battle area, more often than not shoot first and ask questions later. It is obvious that contact with these troops is, at the least, sensitive and a calculated risk. However, in the absence of an opportunity to contact a friendly patrol, this is the only alternative. Generally, frontline personnel are told that the display of a white flag or other white object should be honored



arid that the unknown person be advanced to be recognized.

*b. Method of Contact.* Often, you will be compelled to crawl through the enemy's forward battle position through no man's land to a position near forward friendly elements. This should be accomplished during the hours of darkness so that you can arrive near the friendly positions shortly after dawn. As in establishing contact with a friendly patrol, call out with something typically American and produce a white cloth; or you may choose to crawl into friendly lines and whisper to a frontline sentry. Carefully weigh all factors before deciding upon the method to be used.

## **52. Rescue by Aircraft**

*a. Helicopters Best Suited.* One mission of the United States Air Force and Army aviation is to look for U. S. personnel who have been cut off behind enemy lines. Once you or your group are spotted and identified, special rescue missions can be launched either by air or by ground. The important part of this type operation is positive identification. Enemy units have been known to erect signals on the ground for the express purpose of attracting rescue missions. Rescue by aircraft can be accomplished either by rotary winged craft (helicopters) or conventional winged craft. It is obvious that rotary-winged craft are best suited for rescue work behind enemy lines because they can travel at extremely low altitudes, pass through valleys, and affect a rescue without landing.

*b.* Method of Contact.

- (1) Signal panels used in air-ground communications will not be available, so you must procure locally items and materials which can be used in establishing the standard SOS distress signal.
- (2) The desired minimum and maximum size signals vary greatly. If you are in a combat zone or a heavily populated area, large signals are obviously out of the question. In Korea some evaders used small, distinctly colored scarves, panels, or other items as signals. These small signals were frequently visible even to jet fighters. Others merely used rocks to establish their signal. A civil aeronautics signal card, designed for those who may go down in friendly but isolated terrain, recommends signals 10 feet high. This arbitrary size must be modified in hostile territory. The emergency ground-to-air signals must not jeopardize the evader's security, yet they must be visible to the type of friendly aircraft which may fly over the position. A good general rule is to so disarrange natural elements that friendly aircraft can easily see that the normal terrain pattern has been recently altered. Arrange ground-to-air signals so that they can be removed at a moment's notice, since enemy planes may also fly over the area.

## **53. Contacting Neutral Countries**

Under certain conditions, it may be advantageous to travel to a neutral country rather than to friendly-held territory. This is especially true if you have been moved to camps located hundreds or even thousands of miles from friendly areas. Or in other situations, you may elect to travel to a neutral country because of the lack of travel restrictions imposed along the route to the neutral country in contrast to the usual heavy restrictions found in the combat zone. Upon reaching a neutral country, you must represent yourself as an escaped prisoner of war even though technically you only evaded capture. Your right under international law to be repatriated to the United States is based upon your being an escaped prisoner of war.

### **Section III. SECURITY**

#### **54. Debriefing**

Once back in friendly hands, it is very natural to want to talk about your exploits. And you will undoubtedly receive countless questions from frontline troops. This is the time for you to remain silent, for if you talk at this point, you may conceivably endanger the lives of those who helped you. It may compromise the methods used to evade the enemy which could be used by some other unfortunate individual in getting out safely. You are authorized to give only information of immediate tactical importance to frontline units, unless you are a member of regular patrol actions.

Advise the first officer or NCO contacted that you are returning to duty from "missing in action," "prisoner of war," or "internment" status, and request to be taken to someone expressly, authorized to receive evasion and escape information. The following military officials are authorized to act as debriefers:

*a.* Officers assigned to evasion and escape duties within the intelligence staff sections in Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters in Washington, D. C., and certain other officers holding written authority from such headquarters: The intelligence officer will know of those holding such written authority.

*b.* U. S. Army, Navy, or Air Force attaches in the case of evaders reaching neutral or friendly countries.

## **55. The Need for Security**

The need for secretiveness continues even after you have been completely debriefed by authorized personnel. Particularly guard against disclosure of your experiences behind enemy lines to relatives, friends, representatives of the press, radio, and television. Under no circumstances will you submit information gained while behind enemy lines without specific written authority from the appropriate agency of the U. S. government.

## CHAPTER 6

### CAPTURE

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#### Section 1. INTRODUCTION

##### 56. Prevention of Capture

*a.* Capture is neither dishonorable nor heroic. At times, like an automobile accident, it is unavoidable and comes as a shock. Often it is accompanied by injury. However, experience tables show that a majority of those persons taken into custody could have avoided capture merely by applying basic evasion tactics. Capture is something like a disease that is 90 percent preventable. Case histories reveal that many soldiers made no attempt to avoid capture or in many instances withdrew from tactical positions and were subsequently captured. They ran in the face of the enemy in violation of the principles upon which the United States Army was founded. This is now a violation of Article I of the Code of Conduct (sec. III, ch. 2).

*b.* If in spite of all efforts to evade capture you are taken prisoner, then every waking moment must be spent in developing and executing a plan of escape, not only for yourself but for other prisoners that you may be able to assist. Escape is a duty. This principle is clearly stated in Article III of the Code (sec. III, ch. 2).

## **57. Communist Handling of Prisoners of War**

Under World War II Russian regulations, the movement of prisoners to the rear was conducted in covered terrain where possible. Halts in villages where escapees would have cover were avoided. When there was only a small number of POW's, the regimental POW assembly point was near the regimental CP. If there were large numbers of POW's, the assembly point was at regimental staff rear echelon headquarters. Russian regulations prohibited the location of POW collection points in dense woods or underbrush. In the evacuation of large numbers of POW's, two guards led the column and the escort commander with a majority of the guards brought up the rear. POW's were not permitted to delay the march or to talk to guards, civilians, or other POW's. These procedures for handling POW's are typical and are likely to be followed by any future enemy.

## **Section II. EARLY ESCAPE**

### **58. Advantages**

The concept of early escape is all-important. Chances of successful escape are immeasurably greater if you make your attempt shortly after capture when many factors work to your advantage. Emphasis, therefore, must be placed on the value of early escape, and escape opportunities must be included in the soldiers' basic training.

*a.* At the time of capture, you will be closer to friendly lines than you will ever be again while in custody; you will be oriented as to direction and you will know where friendly

lines are located. You are in better physical condition at this point than you will ever be again while in custody.

*b.* Enemy guards in the forward combat zone are not highly trained as guards; consequently; many escape opportunities will exist. A word of caution here is necessary. Danger of being killed by a guard after capture is greater in the forward combat zone because combat troops are keyed to battle pitch. The slightest provocation may cause them to shoot.

## **59. Opportunities for Early Escape**

See paragraph 2, FM 21-77A.

## **60. Importance of Alertness**

Remain alert to all escape opportunities, for each one may be the last. It is the responsibility of each POW to assist others in escaping, even if it means punishment for himself. Successful escapes have varied from the very simple to the complex. Some of the better escape schemes have been quite simple. The earlier the escape, the simpler it can be; and it cannot be repeated too often that an early escape has the greatest chance of being a successful escape.

## CHAPTER 7

### PRISONER OF WAR CAMP

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#### Section I. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

##### 61. Prisoners' Representatives

*a.* A well organized camp where all POW's work for the common good can spell the difference between hope and despair. A knowledge of Army organization is useful; however, it must be adapted in most cases to cope with special problems inherent in camp survival. One of these problems is, the necessity for establishing a system of representation for facilitating command structure within the camp. The Geneva Convention of 1949 makes the following provisions of election or appointment of prisoners' representatives:

- (1) In camps where there are no officers, the prisoners' representative is elected by secret ballot by the POW's every 6 months. The representative is eligible for reelection.
- (2) In officers' camps and in mixed camps (excluding labor camps), the senior officer is recognized as the prisoners' representative.
- (3) In labor camps where officers are included for handling administrative duties, the prisoners' representative is



elected. Officers are also eligible for election.

*b.* Assistants to the prisoners' representative are selected as follows:

- (1) In camps where there are no officers, assistants are appointed by the prisoners' representative.
- (2) In officer camps, assistants are elected.
- (3) In labor camps where officers are stationed for the purpose of handling administrative duties, and in mixed camps, assistants are elected from among prisoners who are not officers.

*c.* The principal responsibility of the prisoners' representative is to set up an organization that is capable of insuring the best possible living conditions for the prisoners and of keeping them mentally and physically fit. The representative fulfills liaison functions both intracamp and between the POW's and the detaining and protecting powers. In general, his duties require that—

- (1) Each POW be made responsible to someone or for something and each man be encouraged to do a job in which his special abilities or talents can be utilized. In this regard, committees should be established to handle camp administration, welfare, education, sports, and recreation.
- (2) Every opportunity be taken to improve the standards of rations and methods of

cooking. Food must be shared carefully and Red Cross packages, if received, must be distributed fairly. Schemes in the handling of food must be eliminated, and the rule of share and share alike strictly enforced.

## **62. Protecting Powers**

*a.* In order to determine the degree of implementation of these provisions and to safeguard the interests of the countries participating in the conflict, protecting powers (neutral nations) are designated by the detaining powers to examine the application of the provisions to POW's. In addition, subject to the consent of the parties to the conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross may assume the humanitarian functions performed by the protecting powers if the latter are unable or unwilling to operate.

*b.* POW's undergoing confinement as a disciplinary punishment, will continue to enjoy the benefits of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, exclusive of those rendered inapplicable by the confinement. This includes unrestricted right to apply to the representatives of the protecting powers concerning any complaints regarding their conditions of captivity.

## **Section II. TYPICAL COMMUNIST POW CAMPS**

### **63. General**

Communist POW camps generally are characterized by remoteness, ill treatment, hard work, insufficient food, and inadequate clothing and

housing. POW's are exploited severely, both physically and mentally, according to the needs of communist designs; and their state of welfare is directly proportional to their usefulness for communist purposes. If anything can be identified as typical in a communist POW camp, it is the uniformity of the brutal treatment and living conditions accorded the prisoner. Sick POW's are often required to work and march even though they may be "out on their feet." The communists make every effort to keep the POW so exhausted that he can neither maintain his strength to resist nor his will to escape.

#### **64. Physical Description**

A communist POW camp is usually pictured as a cluster of barren, cheerless, and colorless shacks set in a desolate and wind-swept area devoid of vegetation. This is substantially correct and any variation is caused chiefly by differences in terrain and climate. The pattern of armed guards, wire fences, crowded and heatless quarters, and uncomfortable sleeping accommodations is standard whether the camp is in a temperate or arctic zone. Camp buildings, unless improvised from existing structures, are generally long, low, one-story wooden affairs situated in rows. Beds usually take the form of tiered bunks. Straw mattresses may or may not be supplied. In many instances no beds are provided. Even floor pads, in many cases, are not provided. Provisions for heating and cooking are substandard or non-existent and the water supply and toilet facilities are inadequate for the number of prisoners. Such

"refinements" as electric lights, hot baths, laundry tubs, recreation rooms, libraries, and dispensaries are exceptional.

## **65. Internal Security**

*a.* Communist POW camp security measures are directly related to the distance of the camp from the front lines or (POW) friendly territory, the difficulty of the climate or terrain, and the physical difference of the POW from the native element. These conditions were, all-present, to an adverse degree for United Nations personnel, in the Korean campaign. The first two conditions are major factors in camp security in communist nations where POW's usually undergo either penitentiary-type confinement or slave labor camp employment. In the latter case, armed guards, trained dogs, searchlights, and guard towers are used not so much to prevent escapes as to control the prisoner activity within the camp or on work projects. Escape attempts are discouraged by the near impossibility of evasion and the severity of punishment if recaptured.

*b.* Communist POW camp security systems frequently utilize informers to help control the prisoners. The informers may be used to gain intelligence information, to penetrate and neutralize clandestine POW organizations and activities, and to stimulate political thought along the communist lines. In large Soviet POW and/or labor camps, informers may report on rackets or other criminal activity conducted among the prisoners themselves and not necessarily directed against the captors.

## 66. Chain of Command

*a.* Large POW camps usually are divided into several compounds in order to simplify prisoner control. Within the compounds the POW's are further organized for rollcall, work, and ration purposes by barracks leaders who report to compound or camp heads. They may be organized into a structure resembling our squad, platoon, and company system, with, both a prisoner leader and a communist leader for each platoon and company. If in the communist scheme political indoctrination is considered as important as work production on the part of the prisoners, then communist political instructors may be used to achieve this end. These political instructors may be assigned to each camp, company, barracks, or platoon. Usually they exercise jurisdiction over the POW's at least on a par with the regular communist military camp personnel. Such political members also may be associated with POW recreation, food, and sanitation committees in order to wield their influence over all phases of camp activity.

*b.* Prisoners of war also may be segregated according to nationality, rank, race, and their susceptibility or resistance to political indoctrination. Within the companies, platoons, and squads there may be no corresponding assignment of POW rank, inasmuch as communists subordinate the concept of rank in order to give a basis for their indoctrination propaganda that the POW's are merely innocent civilians who were drafted to fight a capitalistic or imperialistic war.

## **67. POW Overt Organizations**

Overt organizations in communist POW camps consist mainly of POW's banded together for recreational or social purposes. These have no apparent active anticommunist direction or purpose, and therefore are tolerated by the communists, who consider them advantageous for propaganda purposes or because they occupy the POW with harmless activity. These organizations, depending on the indulgence of the communists, may include singing groups, sports committees, theatrical and musical aggregations, etc.

## **68. Covert Organizations**

See paragraph 3, FM 21-77A.

# **Section III. SURVIVAL IN POW CAMP**

## **69. The Will to Survive is Essential**

Depending upon living conditions in the POW camp, the will to survive may or may not be an important factor. If food and shelter are reasonably satisfactory and the men are organized and occupied, then morale is naturally high and survival presents no great problem. If these elements are lacking, there is a corresponding absence of the will to live, and the men lapse into a dull, apathetic existence and are apt to fail in their soldierly duty to resist the enemy. Therefore, during periods of hardship the will to survive must be kept alive. It must be augmented and

bolstered through any means available, however limited, and it must rest upon the principles of self-discipline and mutual aid. Hardships as well as pleasures should be shared and all must shoulder, as a common responsibility, the burden of the weak, wounded, or demoralized.

## **70. Psychology of Survival**

The will to survive or indifference to survival may have a psychological explanation based on the reactions of individuals to various stresses. An individual's personality and experience appear to be major factors in determining his reactions. The man who is characterized by aggressiveness, stability, and great energy can be expected to control undesirable reactions better than the man who is shy, irresolute, and depressed. Similarly, an individual who has experienced particular stresses has a basis for patterning his future reactions to these stresses.

*a.* Fear a normal response to a dangerous situation may result in controlled, rational behavior; or it may have disabling effects. Good training and leadership help to minimize these disabling effects, as do comradeship, masculine defiance; and hardening to danger.

*b.* Reactions to pain, cold, thirst, hunger, fatigue, boredom, and loneliness can accumulate until you panic and become unmanageable. These reactions may be suppressed or controlled by strong motivation to survive, to escape, or to resist the enemy at all costs. Boredom and loneliness are particularly likely to bring about mental imbalance

unless you have sufficient strength of character or spiritual faith to resist.

*c.* Group behavior, generally speaking, compares favorably with individual behavior under conditions of stress. This is because there usually is an individual in the group who is stable enough to control the emotionally disturbed. Excluding this group leadership factor, group behavior depends on organization, morale, and attitude. An organized group will resist disrupting forces and persist in its efforts to attain its goal. Group morale, which can be based on several factors, is closely related to the time perspective. Prisoners of war become depressed by the seeming endlessness of time and therefore must establish definite goals to be looked forward to and accomplished.

*d.* Humor is important in a prisoner of war camp. Even though everything around you is tragic, you must laugh to sustain your will to survive. You must consciously work to retain a sense of humor, a sense of the ridiculous. Case histories reveal that some POW's have died without anything organically wrong with them—they simply lost their will to survive. It is the responsibility of each POW to see to it that other POW's do not lose their will to survive.

## **71. Morale**

*a.* One of the worst enemies you have to face is yourself. Hunger, cold, and miserable living conditions can cause you to become moody and antagonistic in an environment where men of different habits, tastes, and temperaments must live and work together for months on end. Under



such conditions, small incidents, usually arising from selfishness or irritability, assume an undue importance that may require the intercession of a peacemaker. It is then that the man who keeps faith with himself, his service, and his country becomes, through his manly bearing and conduct, a source of inspiration to his weaker companions.

*b.* Since they may be treated like cattle, POW's must work hard to retain their self-respect. This can be done by making every effort to keep neat and clean and by keeping mentally and physically busy. While the physical, spiritual, and intellectual well-being of all the POW's is the major concern of the prisoners' representative, each POW 'has the individual responsibility of maintaining a high state of morale. Good morale produces courage, optimism, determination, loyalty, and consideration for others. It also creates an atmosphere in which the will to escape is fostered and developed.

## **72. Medical Problems**

*a.* There is a direct relationship between discipline and survival, in captivity as well as in combat. particularly true during the early phase of a conflict when the enemy is not in a position to provide adequately for the welfare of the POW. And it must be remembered communist medical treatment at its best is well below our standards sometimes not available at all, oftentimes crude and erratic in application. Surviving captivity is largely a matter of maintaining your health under extremely adverse conditions. During past wars, as a result of

the demoralizing effect of inadequate food and medical care, a large number of deaths occurred simply because POW's lost their will to live and gave up the fight without a struggle. In addition, the relatively healthy POW's sometimes showed complete disregard for the welfare of their ill and wounded companions. This conduct fostered a state of mind that made men feel they would be left alone and forsaken should they be taken ill. Therefore, in the absence of enemy medical treatment, attend the weak and ailing if they are unable to provide their own needs. Encourage them to eat and exercise, lest they become indifferent to their own welfare.

*b.* The most serious threats to health are exposure, malnutrition, unsanitary conditions, and lack of medical care. To a large extent these can be alleviated or remedied through personal hygiene, proper food preparation, field sanitation, and first aid. Here discipline and organization are vital factors in establishing corrective measures. You should be aware of the low caliber of medical treatment which you can expect and realize the importance of self-administered care, your responsibility to the group, and basic preventive measures to maintain health under POW conditions. In this way your chances of survival under the communists in any future conflict are considerably enhanced. To this end you should have a thorough understanding of the following points:

- (1) Medical care available to POW's under the communists will not compare favorably with that to which we are accustomed.

- (2) You must learn to use simple but ingenious methods in medical care; making maximum use of local materials and field expedients.
- (3) Modern medicine' is not always essential to survive illness. People became ill and regained health long before the advent of present medical techniques. The average American depends today upon "wonder drugs," fine laboratories, and modern medical equipment. He is inclined to lose sight of the "country doctor" type of medicine and of such aids to survival as determination, common sense, and a few primitive techniques that have been, practiced since ancient times and which are still effective. Man can and does live without "wonder drugs" for every ache and pain. Some of these remedies were practiced by the Greeks, Romans, and Arabs long before the birth of Christ. During basic training, great emphasis must be placed upon basic first aid, personal hygiene, and sanitation. This training must be realistic and each soldier must understand that there may be a time when he will be called upon to practice primitive medicine without the benefit of drugs or medication of any type or without professional medical service.
- (4) The importance of discipline to individual and group survival under POW conditions cannot be overemphasized.

c. The degree of medical attention provided by the communists is in some instances used as a device to gain the cooperation of the POW's and to control them, medical care being granted as a reward to prisoners who cooperate and withheld from those who refuse.

d. Common ailments to expect under adverse conditions are infected wounds, excessive bleeding, burns, diarrhea and dysentery, hepatitis, lice, worms, malnutrition, and pneumonia.

(1) *Wounds*. There are three treatments for a wound under extreme conditions clean it out if possible with hot water, wash it out with urine, and/or pick out all foreign matter. During World War 1, maggots were an accepted treatment for infected wounds. Maggots eat only dead tissue and will clean out a wound better than anything else except surgery. If surgery of any kind is required, remember that the area of a wound is dead. It is easy to stick a needle into it, cut it, or do whatever else is required. You will at times be compelled to lance boils, cysts, and the like. In treating boils, soak the area of the boil in hot water each day for several days; if this does not draw out the infection, open it up. Case histories of POW's show that all types of surgery have been performed successfully by nonmedical personnel without the benefit of anesthesia.

(2) *Bleeding*. Control bleeding by using pressure directly on the wound, by

elevating the injured part, by manual pressure applied to arteries between the wound and the heart, by cold applications, and by use of a tourniquet, Use the tourniquet only when all other means fail to stop the bleeding. Once a tourniquet is applied, do not remove it until other means of controlling the bleeding are made available, or until the blood can be replaced by whole blood or a blood volume expander. Soldiers have lost limbs as a result of improper tourniquets.

- (3) *Burns.* Wash the burned area with sterile water and cover it with a sterile bandage. In the absence of sterile water and bandages, and under extreme circumstances, wash the wound with urine.
- (4) *Dysentery.* Dysentery and diarrhea are serious problems in enemy territory. The risk of dysentery can be greatly lessened through the use of calcium hypochlorite, individual water purification tablets, iodine, or by boiling the water. There will be times when these precautions are not possible. Case histories taken from the POW camps during the Korean conflict describe 8 to 10 stools per day per prisoner as being normal, while 15 indicated simple diarrhea; 25 or more stools per day were diagnosed as dysentery. If you have dysentery, you must replace water lost through stools; if

possible, it should be replaced with boiled water. But at any cost, you must consume large quantities of liquid. You must also eat, even if it means choking down the food. Charcoal will help to stop dysentery; any partially burned piece of wood can be taken, the charred portions scraped off and swallowed. Bones of any kind will help, especially when they are burned and ground into a fine powder between rocks. Ordinary schoolroom chalk, when powdered, will help cure dysentery. Bark from trees, preferably oak trees, will help. Boil the bark from 12 hours to 3 days and as the water evaporates, add more. The resulting brew will be so vile tasting that it will choke you; however, the tannic acid contained in the bark will help cure the dysentery. Tea is another dysentery cure because it contains tannin.

- (5) *Hepatitis*. Hepatitis is a liver disease. Even though the patient will not have the desire to eat, he should be required to eat food and drink large quantities of water. Sedatives, laxatives, and alcohol are to be avoided. Patients should be isolated, if possible, especially during the first week of illness.
- (6) *Lice*. These insects frequently infest POW camps and can kill humans if they are not controlled. Lice also transmit many epidemic diseases. Pick lice off frequently for they breed very rapidly. Regardless of weather, inspect the entire

body and every seam of each garment at least once a day.

(7) *Worms*. Infection by all types of worms round, hook, plate, and the like is possible. They come from the food you eat and the filth in which you live. Personal hygiene is the best preventive measure against worms. Wash the body and clothing as often as possible. If available, kerosene or gasoline is an effective anti-worm remedy; kerosene is more effective but gasoline will do. Take two tablespoons daily; it may make you sick but it should exterminate the worms. Another remedy is the juice from boiled tobacco.

(8) *Pneumonia*. As a POW or evader, you will encounter all types of disease and your resistance will normally be very low. Pneumonia is perhaps the most common disease, especially during winter. If appropriate medicine or drugs are available, use them. Under primitive circumstances, there is but one thing to do-remain standing. This does not mean that you should remain on your feet for 24 hours a day, but for sufficient periods to prevent you from losing your will to live. Be alert and interested or you will die. Case histories reveal that many POW's with pneumonia simply covered their heads, rolled over into a corner, and died.

(9) *Malnutrition*. One basic principle of

survival is to eat. Find something edible and eat it regardless of its smell and appearance. Here self-discipline and a strong will come into play. Say to yourself, "I'll eat everything they give me and the nourishment will help me to get through." POW's have eaten many strange types of food in order to survive, including dogs, cats, rats, weeds, and even maggots. It helps not to be able to identify a strange dish the first time it is served, but after the first time the ingredients make little or no difference. The thought of eating rats and snakes or other reptiles is revolting to the American soldier; however, rats and snakes are edible. Rats should be thoroughly cooked for they carry several diseases. Snakes are eaten the world over and some varieties are considered delicious; even poisonous snakes are edible (see FM 21-76). In preparing snakes for eating, remove the head and skin and cook the snake until well done.

*e.* Chances for survival as an evader or prisoner of war can be extremely good if you do the following things

- (1) Exercise leadership responsibilities
- (2) Maintain military and self discipline.
- (3) Keep up your own and others' morale.
- (4) Recognize and control fear.
- (5) Keep on your feet and keep going.
- (6) Eat everything that is edible.



(7) Nourish your sense of humor.

(8) Practice survival, self-aid, and preventive medicine; use common sense.

(9) Keep up your will to survive.

*f. There is no more important aid to survival than the will to survive and to resist. Regardless of where you may be, how miserable your circumstances, or what the enemy does to you, you must make up your mind that you will live through it!*

### **73. Supply Economy**

*a. Conservation of supplies should be a constant process because—*

(1) You will usually enter confinement with a minimum of equipment.

(2) POW camp life provides a minimum of useful articles.

(3) Repair and replacement of the articles may be delayed or impossible.

*b. Due to the limited facilities available, certain articles may have to serve multiple purposes or they may have to be converted to more necessary items. Therefore, you must take care of your equipment and store away all excess articles, even if they appear to be useless at the moment. Consider, of course, the possibility of their confiscation by the enemy and take action accordingly; but a stock of clothing, food, and miscellaneous utensils may one day help to provide you or others with the means to survive,*

escape, or evade. Concerning escape and evasion, supply economy is especially appropriate to major items of clothing—shoes, trousers, and jackets—and to food, if it can be spared and is not perishable. The important point to remember is that a POW existence, although confined, is never secure, and you must try to provide for unpleasant eventualities. This, as exemplified by the communist POW camps, generally takes the form of primitive living conditions resulting from a shortage of supplies.

#### **74. POW Handicrafts**

See paragraph 4, FM 21-77A.

### **Section IV. TACTICAL INTERROGATION**

#### **75. Immediate Interrogation of Prisoners**

*a.* The extent, scope, and vigor of tactical interrogations will vary with the urgency of the combat situation, but it can be assumed that the newly captured prisoner will be subjected to early interrogation in the combat zone. During World War II, German prisoners captured by the Russians were interrogated for approximately 30 minutes in the battalion area on purely military matters pertaining to the immediate tactical situation. After this first interrogation, the prisoners were moved to the regimental area where they were questioned in more detail about the military situation, to include Order of Battle. This completed, the prisoners were taken to

division level where German officers and noncommissioned officers were subjected to additional interrogation on military subjects. It was at army level that German prisoners received a prepared questionnaire containing approximately 140 questions covering subjects of strategic value and personality data on the prisoner.

*b.* During the Korean conflict, United Nations prisoners were greeted a little differently by the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean Peoples Army. Usually an English-speaking interrogator greeted newly captured prisoners in the forward combat zone and advised them that he would brief them on their responsibilities as prisoners of war. Although tactical interrogation for information of immediate value in the combat situation was conducted, prisoners were usually evacuated to the rear before extensive interrogation began. Information sought during tactical interrogations concerned identifications of units in the combat zone, strength of units and reserves, locations of defenses, minefields, etc.

## **76. Prisoner's Response to Interrogation**

In the event of capture, you are authorized to give only your name, rank, service number, date of birth, and nothing more. The most effective defense against interrogation is to give only this information and then maintain silence. According to communist bloc reservations to the Geneva Convention, the signing of a confession or the making of a statement is likely to be used to convict you as a war criminal under the laws of

your captors. This conviction has the effect of removing you from the prisoner of war status and, according to this communist bloc device, denying you any protection under terms of the Geneva Convention, or repatriation until a prison sentence is served.

# CHAPTER 8

## ENEMY INTERROGATION

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### Section I. COMMUNIST METHODS

#### 77. Interrogation at Strategic Level

*a.* Apart from securing information of a purely tactical nature, enemy interrogation is directed toward gaining information of strategic value concerning conditions in the United States and the U. S. Army, and determining basic attitudes and susceptibility of the prisoner to communist influence (see DA Pam 30-101). In general, communist interrogation at a strategic level will include—

- (1) General data covering the whole past life of the POW up to his military service.
- (2) Condition of the Armed Forces of the United States with an elaborate quiz on all phases of the prisoner's career as a soldier.
- (3) Conditions in the zone of interior with a searching inquiry into all phases of home front activity.
- (4) Political attitudes and convictions of the prisoner.
- (5) The prisoner's attitude toward communist propaganda.

*b.* The foregoing questions are usually in a prepared questionnaire given to the POW at army level or while en route to a permanent prison camp. Use of the questionnaire is one of the standard communist techniques of interrogation and was used against American prisoners of war in Korea.

## **78. Use of Questionnaires**

Once located in a permanent POW camp, you will be subjected to an organized program of communist interrogation and indoctrination. As soon as administrative processing is completed, you will be required to complete a second questionnaire which covers important aspects of your life. The two questionnaires are then checked against each other for discrepancies. All interrogations are based upon these questionnaires with emphasis placed upon any discrepancies noted. For the unfortunate weak who give information to their captors other than that authorized by the Geneva Conventions and the Code of Conduct, this is the beginning of a long period of interrogation and ideological indoctrination. The communist interrogator does not give up easily, and he will continue in his efforts to induce you to give information. Pressure will be increased and new approaches will be tried. Your comfort in the prison camp will not be increased by giving information. No matter how friendly the interrogators appear before you talk, they invariably despise you afterwards.

## **Section II. RESISTING INTERROGATION**

## 79. Conduct of POW During Interrogation

If, in the face of threats, bribes, and cajolery, you refuse to talk, you earn the respect of your captors and always fare better than the weakling. Your first line of defense against communist interrogation and subsequent indoctrination is your military bearing, silence, and a trust in yourself; the Army, your country, and your God. The following factors will help you to resist enemy interrogation

*a.* Give only your name, rank, service number, and date, of birth.

*b.* Be respectful during interrogation but do not convey the impression of willingness to cooperate through obsequious "politeness." Such an idea, once planted in the mind of the enemy, may prolong the inquisition.

*c.* If you act stupid, it may induce an interrogator to dismiss you as a waste of time. If the enemy believes you may have knowledge of vital information, or appear to be in the intellectual or educated group, you will be passed to higher levels for interrogation.

*d.* Put off interrogators by saying you do not know the answers to the questions or by refusing to talk. These tactics are frequently sufficient.

*e.* Beware of "stool pigeons" and POW damp medical personnel who are 'used extensively to collect information.

*f.* If you can speak the enemy's language, do not disclose this ability nor admit it during an

interrogation. If an interpreter has to be used, the advantage is yours for you will gain time to formulate answers. Furthermore, you will be in a better position to obtain information since enemy soldiers will speak in your presence or within your hearing. Knowledge of the enemy's language will automatically increase your chances for successful escape.

g. Never believe statements by the enemy that your friends have talked. This is merely orthodox procedure to catch you off guard and cause you to talk.

h. Avoid looking the interrogator directly in the eye. This may allow him to get information without a direct answer. Pick out a spot between the eyes or on the forehead and stare at it.

i. While being interrogated, be courteous but firm in your refusal to give information. Salute all interrogation officers.

j. Never give information about other POW's. If the name of a fellow POW is mentioned during interrogation, warn him if possible of the enemy's interest in him so that he can be on his guard.

k. Beware of the temptation to impress interrogators by boasting of exploits either true or fabricated. Analysis of Russian interrogation methods made by an escapee concludes with these statements: "I am convinced that many men have paid a high price for an overpowering ambition to appear important, which led them to talk about their exploits at the front and in rear areas. As a result of this; they were sentenced to many years at hard labor. *A prisoner in Russia has only one*



*effective means of defense and that is absolute silence toward everyone."*

*l.* If you are a good soldier, you will also be a good prisoner; you will understand the reasons behind the war in which you are engaged; you will be endowed with the *esprit* and traditions of the U. S. Army which have made it successful in all major battles throughout its history. You will not have to be reminded of Article IV of the Code of Conduct (sec. III, ch. 2), for it is the creed by which you lived during civilian life as well as in the Army. With this in mind, you should remind yourself that the enemy's attempt to fill your mind with communistic ideas contrary to the American way of life is an insidious attack on your comrades, your family, your country, and yourself. To this end, the training of men both during civilian life and in military service should be directed.

## **80. Political Nature of Communist Interrogation**

*a.* Throughout all interrogations, communist preoccupation with political aspects of war becomes evident. They seek to root out bitter enemies and to discover those who might be friends. The process of communist indoctrination begins as early as possible. At division level, special interrogators begin exhaustive interrogations, and in some instances, a panel of interrogators seeks to confuse the POW by questioning him simultaneously on unrelated matters. Prisoners whom the communists believe to possess important information are shipped back to army level as soon as possible.

*b.* The communists foster rivalry and distrust between individuals who are assigned to overlapping responsibilities. The several agencies participating in the interrogations do not always exchange information. Lower echelons are specifically forbidden to gather strategic information, evidently because the communists do not want the truth about conditions in other countries to become general knowledge.

## **81. Characteristics of Communist Interrogators**

*a.* Communist interrogation techniques during World War II and the Korean action were many and varied, and yet they all eventually took on a political pattern. The particular technique employed depended on the interrogator's or the political officer's assessment of the individual prisoner and his basic attitudes and susceptibility to ideological indoctrination. Each of the communist nations has different characteristics affecting its methods of interrogation and indoctrination.

*b.* There is among the Russians a wide variation of mood, which fluctuates erratically from exuberant good-natured cordiality to gloomy depression and cruelty. Much that is considered incredibly cruel to the American soldier does not seem so to the Russian. The Russians' tacit basic acceptance of the individual's insignificance and the lower standards of living in Russia are at least partially responsible for their callous treatment of others. The Russians adopt a superior, attitude toward other nations to compensate for a vast national inferiority complex. Since Tsarist days,

there has been a complete atmosphere of distrust in the Soviet Union. The absurd government regulations which condemn failure as a crime tantamount to treason and punishable by death make interrogators prone to go to any lengths to get information or to get a signed confession, even about things which the POW could not possibly know. An obsession for the political interpretation of facts runs throughout all Russian thought and conversation.

## **82. Methods of Persuasion**

*a.* At strategic interrogations, usually at army level or at a permanent POW camp, communist interrogators have used the following methods to persuade a POW to talk:

- (1) Required him to double time in a heated room while wearing a fur coat.
- (2) Permitted him to wear only underwear while he was locked in a dungeon with a floor of sharp edged stones, a bench of steel or stone, and with no toilet facilities. There he remained several days, the temperature of the dungeon so low that he could neither lie nor sit down on the cold floor or bench.
- (3) Forced him to sit on a stool with no back or arms on which to lean, with his hands hanging loosely at his sides and his feet stretched out for a maximum time of 180 hours. The prisoner's feet swelled painfully until he was unable to walk. At a subsequent interrogation, he was

permitted to sit on only half the stool with his feet as before. After this treatment, the POW was neither physically nor mentally able to endure another interrogation for at least 3 days.

- (4) Tied and raised his hands behind his back and forced him to stand on the tips of his toes.
- (5) Administered lashings with whips made of small steel rods.
- (6) Forced him to stand for 5 days so that his legs swelled enormously.
- (7) Required him to sit at attention for days at a time without sleep.
- (8) Attached electrical contacts to his throat and stomach anal turned on the current for 3 minutes at a time. Normally a doctor was in attendance to determine how much he could stand.
- (9) Starved him or gave him foul food, beat him with a blackjack, interrogated him day and night without interruption, locked him in a small cupboard, etc.
- (10) Made torture and solitary confinement routine, sometimes in cells so small that the prisoner was forced to stand.
- (11) Forced him to sit in a position with, head bent back. A towel was then draped over the prisoner's head and water was continually poured on the towel. Eventually the prisoner suffocated or drowned, or was revived for more questioning.

- (12) Required him to kneel with steel rods placed behind his knees. This prevented proper blood circulation in the legs and feet, which eventually swelled. He was kept in this position for as long as 2 days
- (13) Ripped off his fingernails and provided him no medical assistance:
- (14) Forced him to stand on tiptoes with his hands tied behind his back. A noose was then placed around his neck and the free end of the rope passed over a crossbeam and tied to the prisoner's secured hands. The POW eventually tired, fell, and hanged himself.
- (15) Handled timid people harshly, threatened them, locked them up, and beat them. Stupid ones were bluffed. Sentimental types were reminded of, their families. Unstable characters were led on by the promises of early release, better food, etc. The interrogator adjusted his, methods to the person questioned.

*b.* Strategic interrogations on industrial methods, etc, were carried out in special camps by officials of the various industrial ministries.

*c.* Interrogations of the MVD (the secret police of the Russian Ministry of the Interior) attempted only to a very limited extent to obtain military information. The MVD, with different purposes from those of the Army, sought to convict POW's of criminal acts and thus; prevent them from going home. MVD interrogations were varied,

precise, cruel, and inhuman. The MVD, whose members were graduates of several years of training in psychology, handled the investigation and punishment of crimes. These agents, exceptionally shrewd, cunning, and tricky, far surpassed the average German prisoners in mental ability.

*d.* The Chinese Communist Forces and the North Koreans employed many of the techniques referred to in a above, to secure information from United Nations prisoners of war in Korea. Both Chinese and North Korean interrogations were characterized .by harsh and brutal treatment; however, in no instance was it reported that an American POW was killed for failure to give information other than his name, rank, service number, and date of birth. It appears that Chinese interrogators and political officers were more interested in converting the American POW to communist ideology. This subject is treated extensively in chapter 9.

## **CHAPTER 9**

### **ENEMY INDOCTRINATION**

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#### **83. Communist Indoctrination Program**

*a.* The communist quest for control over men's minds was very much evident in POW camps during World War II and the Korean conflict. Allied POW's were subjected to a wide variety of indoctrinal experiences (see DA Pam 30-101). The purpose of this indoctrination program was to

- (1) Develop propaganda.
- (2) Gain control over the prisoners during their internment.
- (3) Convert the POW to communist ideology.

*b.* The communists did not attempt to convert every United Nations prisoner. They wanted to indoctrinate a few selected prisoners whom they could trust to accept communism as a way of life and who could subsequently develop into communist revolutionists. Primarily, they attempted to destroy or at least reduce the hostility felt by the prisoners toward the communist cause; they attempted to plant seeds of doubt which would grow and produce an attitude which was less opposed to communism.

#### **84. Defense Against Indoctrination**

Defenses against enemy interrogation apply equally well to indoctrination. If the interrogator cannot induce you to give information other than name, rank, service number, and

date of birth, then indoctrination obviously is impossible. The uncooperative POW is considered poor material for indoctrination. Confidence in yourself, trust in your unit, your country, and your God serve as a very effective bulwark against indoctrination. Above all, you must retain your will to survive, both physically and psychologically.

## **85. Techniques of Communist Indoctrination**

In attempting to make indoctrination effective, the communists employ a number of tactics and methods. However, a close study of their indoctrination program shows three basic techniques repetition, harassment, and humiliation.

*a. Repetition.* This technique was used against all prisoners at one time or another. The prisoners were required to memorize certain material and were questioned and examined on such subject matter for days, weeks, and months. They were asked to answer the same questions over and over again. They were required to read the same communist propaganda over and over again. By repetition, the enemy caused some prisoners, with relatively poor formal education, to memorize heavy works on communism and economics. Some of these prisoners memorized entire sections of books by Stalin and Lenin. As a result of this repetition technique, some prisoners having no formal education beyond the sixth grade could recite long essays on communism and its economic and political theories. These same prisoners could not recite a single line of the Bill of Rights or the Constitution of the United States. The theory of repetition is related to the "big lie."



The communists believe that if a lie is told often enough and if the people under control are required to repeat, it enough, they will ultimately believe it.

*b. Harassment.* This technique, like repetition, was used against a great number of prisoners. Only the trusted and proven collaborators escaped harassment. This technique was employed on a precise schedule that did not vary from day to day, week to week, or month to month. Its purpose was to create a state of anxiety in the prisoners—to keep them tense and in a state of constant uncertainty. It also served to make the prisoners believe that eventually harassment would end and they could live as normally as possible in a prison. Harassment was usually based on trumped up charges against prisoners. These "charges" could be anything from a very minor infraction of the rules to a major infraction such as striking an enemy officer. However, it worked best on, and was designed for, prisoners who "committed" minor offenses in connection with the indoctrination program.

- (1) If a prisoner happened to fall asleep during class indoctrination, he was aroused and ordered to report to camp headquarters where the interrogation staff operated around the clock. At the GHQ, the prisoner was given along lecture on attention in class and was urged to take part in the discussions. While at GHQ, he was subjected to a brief interrogation. The manner in which the interrogators approached him gave him the impression that he would not be recalled

unless he committed another "offense." But the prisoner did not know that his harassment would never end and that he would be ordered back to the GHQ again and again—that he would be summoned at all hours of the day and night or perhaps several days later when he had forgotten about the minor matter. The pattern was the same—he was given another lecture and asked a few more questions. Each time believing that this would be the last time, the prisoner usually gave a little more information, hoping that the enemy would consider him cooperative and refrain from ordering him back at a later date.

- (2) This technique of harassment deprived the prisoners of what the enemy knew they wanted more than anything—"free" time. The communists arranged it so that no prisoner except the favored few collaborators would have any "off duty" time. There is no doubt that the harassment was carefully designed, because the prisoners were called to GHQ at odd and annoying times; for example, when they were about to enter the latrine, when they were preparing to eat, or after they had gone to sleep. To call a prisoner at 3 o'clock in the morning was not unusual. At such odd times, the prisoner usually listened and talked freely, again hoping that he would be left alone after that one meeting. What the prisoner did not know was that many prisoners, subjected to this harassment, served as an endless

source of bits of information which the enemy occasionally obtained when a prisoner was summoned for some so-called "offense."

- (3) This technique also served to obtain "confessions" from prisoners. Numerous prisoners were ordered to GHQ for some alleged "offense," and before they left, they had signed a "confession" in which they criticized themselves for having committed the alleged acts against their captors. Other prisoners, whose resistance was worn thin by this technique, gave incriminating information about themselves or about others. The final results of this technique found the unwary prisoners in a web which had been methodically woven around them and from which escape was almost impossible. When the prisoners finally realized how they themselves had helped create the situation, despair usually followed, and they believed that it mattered little what they told the enemy or what they signed, whether about themselves, about their fellow prisoners, or about the U.S. Government, because it was all done in an effort to "defend" themselves. The only effective defense against this technique is *don't talk!*

*c. Humiliation.* This technique was used against prisoners who demonstrated a great deal of personal pride. Its objective was to break down

a prisoner's personal pride by making him look ridiculous in the eyes of the other prisoners. To be effective, it was almost always used by the enemy in the presence of other prisoners. It was designed to provoke shame and embarrassment. This humiliation ultimately had its effect, and the communists knew it.

- (1) Humiliation serves to dramatize certain aspects of the indoctrination. On one occasion, a prisoner picked up a cucumber in the farmer's garden. A Chinese guard observed him and, naturally, reported it to GHQ. The prisoner was called to GHQ and given a long lecture on stealing. The prisoner was asked why he had picked up the cucumber. He replied, "Because I was hungry." He was then told he could not possibly be hungry because he was being provided plenty of good food. The officer then proceeded to tell the prisoner that he had stolen the cucumber because "stealing" was part of the American way of life, and the Fords, Rockefellers, and Morgans had made their money by stealing from the people. The prisoner was requested to write a "confession" and did so. In his "confession" he was instructed to criticize himself for stealing the cucumber and to say that it was a result of his "training" in the United States. He wrote that he was a thief and that the communists would help eliminate this habit from his life. But this "confessing" in private was not the end. Several days later he was called to face a formation and to read his "confession" to

the assembled prisoners. After calling himself a thief and criticizing the "environment" in which he lived in the United States, he asked the communists to forgive him for having stolen the cucumber. For obvious reasons the prisoner was not permitted to use terms other than "steal" or "stole" in the confessions. The reaction to these displays of humiliation was one of disgust, and the prisoners usually looked upon the prisoner who made such open "confessions" with scorn, and denounced him as a weakling. After this denunciation, the prisoner would then be told by the enemy that the communists were "the only friends he had, and, therefore, he should cooperate with them. Like others, this technique was not stopped unless it proved ineffective.

- (2) Some of the enemy's informants were recruited as a result of humiliation. When additional informants were desired, or someone was needed for a special target, a prisoner would be approached who had been subjected to humiliation. The prisoner would be told certain information was needed about other prisoners and it was desired that he furnish this information. If the prisoner hesitated or appeared reluctant to perform this unpleasant duty, he was told that his fellow prisoners did not have respect for him because he had already admitted that he was a "thief" and a "liar" and that the

only friends he had were the communists. If the prisoner still refused, the enemy would summon him to the interrogation room at GHQ and display all the "confessions" he had signed and play back the recordings which he did not know the enemy had made of all past conversations. Then the enemy would threaten to send all such material to the United States for possible use in some future action against the prisoner. Caught in this trap of his own making, the prisoner agreed to be an informer for the enemy, which, in the eyes of the other prisoners, was as low as a man could go.

## **86. How Communists Select POW's for Indoctrination**

During the Korean conflict a document attesting to the overall evaluation of the American prisoner of war was captured from the Chinese Communist Forces. This document, showing in some detail how the Red Chinese selected prisoners for indoctrination, is quoted below.

*a.* "When more than one is captured, we should select those officers from the group who have the longest service, as they are generally more experienced and clear minded. We must not waste our time on "Don't know nothing." It is advisable to have preliminary conversations with the prisoners before selecting them for further interrogations.

*b.* Prisoners should be segregated according to their manners and political attitudes, and their daily lives should be watched by certain assigned

personnel.

c. Secure information concerning the prisoners' personal background, military history, military experience, and their opinion concerning the Korean war. These will serve as basic information for further interrogation and education of the prisoners.

d. Explain our policies to the prisoners by telling them of our traditional good treatment of POW's, thus removing their fear and mental obstacles. Then, if possible, try to make them comprehend a few important things, such as their self-conceitedness. Thus we can have more understanding of the prisoners and can work out further methods and procedures in handling them.

e. Special interrogations will be conducted for the more stubborn and wicked prisoners. Procedures for these interrogations will be outlined in advance. Find their essentially weak points, tell them of their conflicting thoughts, and discover their errors and tell them about it.

f. Some of the characteristics of Americans are fear of death, tiredness of war, and not knowing why they should fight in Korea. They feel that they are cheated and forced to come to Korea. Their minds are deeply poisoned by reactive propaganda and they think that the American way of life is best. If we treat them well and convince them of our policies, we may get valuable information due to their lack of firm conviction.

g. Prisoners can be divided into the following groups:

(1) "*Progressive type*. Mostly youthful

soldiers who sympathize with our thinking. They are willing to talk so we should give them encouragement and education. We should treat them very well so that they can work for us and give us information of real value. They should be given opportunity to write statements because they might remember better by writing.

- (2) "*The stubborn, reactive, afraid-of-death, homesick type.* These have no firm convictions; therefore, we should find their weakness and instill fear in them so as to get information. There is no sense in trying to convince or educate this type."



# CHAPTER 10

## ESCAPE FROM POW CAMP

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### Section I. GENERAL

#### 87. The Value of Escape

The tactical doctrine of the U. S. Armed Forces supports the principle that the best defense is a good offense. This aggressive fighting spirit must be carried from the front lines into the enemy's POW camps. If you become a POW, you are not relieved from the responsibility of risking your life to defend your fellow soldiers and your country. Instead of accepting captivity passively, you are duty-bound to make and take opportunities to escape.

*a.* Capture does not terminate your usefulness to your country. Through continuing aggressive action by resisting the enemy and attempting to escape, you continue the battle from behind enemy lines. As a result of these actions, you continue your role as an active soldier with the following results

- (1) You may reach freedom and avoid the miseries of the prison camp.
- (2) During escape travel you may collect military information that would be of interest to United States intelligence personnel.

- (3) The enemy is required to augment the number of guard personnel and to send out search parties when an escape has been discovered, thus creating additional manpower burdens.
- (4) The constant crises disrupt the enemy's POW administration.
- (5) The nuisance effect is detrimental to enemy military and civilian morale.
- (6) Escapes and attempted escapes improve the morale of our troops and are good propaganda weapons.
- (7) Your return to U. S. forces and to the job for which you were trained adds to the country's manpower resources. You must realize the dangers of the enemy's seemingly harmless effort to "educate" you, and you must combat it with the convictions of common sense and your own knowledge of the facts of the democratic social system.

*b.* Since attempting to escape is the most effective means of continuing the battle within the POW camp, concentrate your energy on the preparation and execution of escapes or allied activity. Such welfare efforts as provided by theatrical or musical groups are desirable from the standpoint of morale; however, they should not detract from escape activity. If possible, they should augment it by providing cover or aid in some form.

## **88. Planning an Escape**

See paragraph 5, FM 21-77A.

## **Section II. ORGANIZING FOR ESCAPE**

## **89. The Escape Committee**

See paragraph 6, FM 21-77A.

## **90. Purpose of Committee**

See paragraph 7, FM 21-77A.

## **91. Composition of Escape Committee**

See paragraph 8, FM 21-77A.

## **92. Security**

See paragraph 9, FM 21-77A.

# **Section III. ESCAPE TECHNIQUES**

## **93. Methods of Escape**

See paragraph 10, FM 21-77A.

## **94. Tunneling**

See paragraph 11, FM 21-77A.

# **Section IV. ESCAPE DEVICES**

## **95. General**

*a.* Escape engineering and most individual escape attempts require the use, of a variety of tools. Stealing tools from guards or working parties, while producing good tools, may also lead to serious reprisals. Also, the quantity and type, which can be procured in this fashion, are rarely adequate for the requirements. The improvisation of tools therefore becomes extremely important.

*b.* Imprisonment serves as a stimulus for the development of hidden talents. Ingenuity and determination, combined with the available elements

of technical knowledge and experience, can result in the solution of problems which normally appear to be insurmountable. Among most groups, a certain number of craftsmen, artists, and handymen will be available. Such persons can use their skills in the manufacture of escape devices when the need arises. It is safe to say, therefore, that few undertakings are beyond the capabilities of the average POW camp personnel.

## **96. Materials Useful as Escape Aids**

See paragraph 12, FM 21-77A.

## **97. Tools**

See paragraph 13, FM 21-77A.

# **Section V. ESCAPE DOCUMENTATION**

## **98. General**

Escape from a POW camp is only the first phase in your bid for freedom. After escape, you are faced with the problem of moving through hostile territory to a point of safety which may be many miles distant. You have two courses of action to travel cross-country during darkness, avoiding contact with the enemy; or to travel in disguise, risking detection. If qualified linguistically or otherwise to travel in, disguise, you need certain documents to justify your movements. For this reason, you must be familiar with enemy documents and must provide yourself with such documents or forgeries thereof.

## **99. Identity Documents**

See paragraph 14, FM 21-77A.

## **100. Methods of Production**

See paragraph 15, FM 21-77A.

### **101. Maps**

See paragraph 16, FM 21-77A.

### **102. Photographs**

See paragraph 17, FM 21-77A.

### **103. Official Stamps**

See paragraph 18, FM 21-77A.

### **104. Casting**

See paragraph 19, FM 21-77A.

### **105. Clothing**

See paragraph 20, FM 21-77A.

## **Section. VI. COVERUP AT ROLLCALL**

### **106. General**

*a.* Once you escape, chances of successful evasion are greatly increased if knowledge of the escape can be kept from the enemy guards. The best time to escape is at night just after the last rollcall. Since the next rollcall will usually not be held until morning, you will have several hours before guards detect the break. If your absence can be covered up at rollcall for several days, you gain even more time. In most escape attempts which failed during World War II, the POW's were recaptured not far from the camps shortly after escaping. To a large extent this was due to the fact that the enemy security forces in the area had been alerted. On the other hand, other evaders, traveling prior to the alert or in areas where the enemy had not been

alerted to watch for escaped prisoners, enjoyed astounding freedom of movement on occasion, even in daylight and in direct contact with enemy elements.

*b.* The rollcall cover-up may be part of the evasion plan. If it fails, the evasion collapses. Such a case might occur when the POW plans to board a train in disguise at a specific time in a station near the camp. If his escape and absence from the camp remain undetected, the train station police will not have been alerted and the prisoner's appearance there would not be cause for undue suspicion. However, if his escape has been discovered and the station security forces alerted, he probably would be the object of intensive search. Similarly, other cases may depend upon the time element, perhaps relating to the changing of the guard personnel, curfew restrictions, bridge crossings, ferry departures, etc. The nature of the escape determines in part the amount of force and effort used by the authorities to apprehend escapees. For example, if there has been a mass escape, it is probable that a large police force will be alerted. Too, it may be desirable to cover up the escape in order to employ the escape scheme again the following day. This is necessary because the enemy, upon learning of an escape, will make every effort to discover the method of escape and to take appropriate countermeasures.

## **107. Methods of Covering Up**

See paragraph 21, FM 21-77A.

# **APPENDIX I**

## **REFERENCES**

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AR 320-50	Authorized Abbreviations.
AR 350-30	Code of Conduct.
AR 350-225	Survival, Evasion, and Escape Training.
SR 320-5-1	Dictionary of United States Army Terms.
FM 8-50	Bandaging and Splinting.
FM 21-5	Military Training.
FM 21-6	Techniques of Military Instruction.
FM 21-11	First Aid for Soldiers.
FM 21-13	The Soldier's Guide.
FM 21-18	Foot Marches.
FM 21-20	Physical Training.
FM 21-26	Map Reading.
FM 21-30	Military Symbols.
FM 21-41	Soldier's Handbook for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare.
FM 21-60	Visual Signals.
FM 21-75	Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling.
FM 21-76	Survival.
FM 21-150	Hand-to-hand Combat.
FM 27-10	The Law of Land Warfare.
FM 30-5	Combat Intelligence.
FM 31-21	Guerilla Warfare and Special Warfare Operations.

(S) FM 31-21A	Guerilla Warfare and Special Warfare Operations (U).
FM 31-25	Desert Operations.
FM 31-60	River-Crossing Operations.
FM 31-70	Basic Cold Weather Manual.
FM 31-71	Northern Operations.
FM 31-72	Mountain Operations.
FM 72-20	Jungle Operations.
FM 105-5	Maneuver Control.
TM 21-200	Physical Conditioning.
DA Pam 20-151	Lectures on the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
DA Pam 21-81	Individual Training in Collecting and Reporting Military Information.
DA Pam 30-101	Communist Interrogation, Indoc-trination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War.
DA Pam 108-1	Index of Army Motion Pictures, Filmstrips, Slides, and PhonoRecordings.
DA Pam 310-1	Index of Administrative Publications.
DA Pam 310-3	Index of Training Publications.
DA Pam 310-5	Index of Graphic Training Aids and Devices.
DA Pam 355-6	Officer's Call. Command and the Code- Never Surrender.



## **APPENDIX II**

### **TRAINING PROGRAM**

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#### **Section I. GENERAL**

##### **1. Purpose**

This appendix is a guide for the training and indoctrination of individuals and units in the principles and techniques of evasion and escape in their relationship to the Code of Conduct. Included are suggested methods for indoctrinating each member of the U. S. Army as to his obligations and behavior during combat or captivity and guidance for specific and integrated training.

##### **2. Objective**

The general objective of training in support of the Code of Conduct is to increase the individual will to resist, thereby increasing unit-fighting strength. To attain this, the following specific objectives must be achieved:

###### *a.* Individual Training.

- (1) A knowledge of the basic truths of the democratic institution and of the fallacies of communism to develop resistance to enemy indoctrination through motivation toward the nation's objectives.
- (2) A feeling of belonging and being loyal to the unit, and strong feeling of loyalty

toward individual fellow soldiers.

- (3) A knowledge and appreciation of unit, Army, and national history and traditions.
- (4) Stronger moral fiber and religious motivation.
- (5) Training in sanitation and hygiene and in the mental, moral, and physical requirements of survival in the field.
- (6) An understanding of the Geneva Conventions and the "war criminal" concept of military law as it applies to prisoners of war.
- (7) A knowledge of the organization and leadership which must be established in a POW camp to enable the individual to meet the conditions of captivity by utilizing group and individual loyalties and to avoid collaboration and informing.
- (8) A knowledge of the basic techniques of interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation of prisoners used by the communists and how to combat, obstruct, and thwart these devices.
- (9) An understanding of what a personal code of conduct is and how it can affect the lives of many soldiers, the outcome of battles, and the reputation of the Army.

*b. Unit Training.*

- (1) Training in methods of organized assistance to isolated units and individuals, and operations to liberate POW groups.
- (2) Training in the operations of isolated units, utilizing their own firepower and

fighting ability to carry out the combat missions with combat and logistical support from the air.

- (3) Training through demonstrations in maneuvers, using maneuver prisoners, in interrogation and indoctrination techniques, and in the exploitation of prisoners in respect to questionnaires, broadcasts, and written statements.
- (4) Training in counterattacks to aid or assist isolated units or individuals.

## **Section II. IMPLEMENTATION**

### **3. General**

*a.* Implementation of the Code of Conduct is successful only through realization on the part of both trainer and trainee that the code is the end result of training, that in satisfying existing training requirements the standards outlined in the code are also achieved. Character guidance and troop information programs have always had as a primary purpose the development of attitudes, motives, loyalties, and moral stamina which are requisite in the code.

*b.* All training prescribed in current training programs is designed to provide training for individuals and units in support of the Code of Conduct. The direct application of the principles of the code must be emphasized in all phases of training, aimed at developing correct habits of conduct in combat or in captivity. The Code of Conduct should become so much a part of an individual's training that he will recall its general

provisions without hesitation.

c. The following subjects lend themselves to integration in support of the Code of Conduct and provide examples of how this integration may be accomplished. The suggestions can; be used as a guide for adapting the program to meet the needs of the particular unit. Commanders must develop additional approaches to fit local requirements.

#### **4. Basic Combat Training**

a. *Code of Conduct and Rules of Land Warfare to Include Geneva Conventions.* Three hours have been allotted to this subject. Following is a suggested method of presenting that portion of the instruction pertaining directly to the Code of Conduct

- (1) Whenever possible, avoid a simple lecture describing the Code of Conduct. Make the fullest possible use of training aids and teaching techniques designed, to insure that the trainee understands and is capable of relating the principles of the, code to all phases of combat activity.
- (2) The instructors should be thoroughly familiar with DA Pams 21-71 and 30-101.
- (3) Since the Code of Conduct has implications of importance in terms of purely tactical military operations, plus legal considerations and medical and psychological principles, presentation of this subject by a group of instructors is most effective. The individual members of the group might be one representative

from the combat arms, one from the Judge Advocate Section, and one from the Army Medical Service.

- (4) In the actual presentation to troops or at officers' call, examine the code point by point. Read each article with a transparency or poster illustrating the article. After each article has been read, have individual members of the team point out the meaning of the article in relation to military, legal, or medical aspects. Examples of comments relating to some of the points in the code follow in (B) below.
- (5) An extremely effective device to insure clear presentation of the articles can be prepared in a small mimeographed or printed booklet spelling out the points of the code. The same illustrations used in transparency or poster form can be incorporated into this booklet, which should be simple and clear in format. A copy of this booklet may be given to each trainee to assist him in following the discussion on the various points of the code and to act as a tangible reminder of what has been taught.
- (6) In addition to the explanatory comments included in the Code of Conduct, members of the instruction team should point out in their discussion such things as the following
  - (a) Article I.

*1. Military member:*

POW camp as an extension of the battlefield where fight must continue.

*2. Legal member:*

"I am prepared to give my life" does not require needless sacrifice.

This statement sets no time or space limit on soldier's duty.

(b) Article II.

*1. Military member:*

Traditions relating to act of surrender.

Surrender as opposed to capture; the difference.

*2. Legal member:*

Provisions of UCMJ relating to surrender; penalties provided.

*3. Medical member:*

Psychological results of surrender guilt, self-condemnation, depression.

(c) Article III. "Continue to resist, try to escape, accept no favors." See DA Pam 30-101.

*1. Military member:*

Define resistance in practical terms, such as passive resistance and obstructionism, uncooperativeness but maintenance of correct military behavior; differentiate from acts which might bring needless retaliation by enemy.

Value of resistance; tying up enemy tactical and logistical strength to guard uncooperative prisoners.

Escape organizations; selection of escapees; preparation for escape activities; effect on enemy.

## *2. Legal member:*

Geneva Conventions regarding escape; possible punishment for attempted escape; legal limits on resistance activities destruction of property, injury to guards; names of countries not signatories of the Geneva Conventions.

## *3. Medical member:*

Psychological necessity for escape activities and resistance: fight and flight as the best human defenses against fear and anxiety.

Unifying effect of resistance activities.

Vicarious satisfaction of all participants in successful escape; escapee is dependable link with home and country and family.

Motivational benefit to prisoner of resistance and escape activity the psychological "push" needed to keep active, care for self and others.

Destruction of self-respect and confidence in accepting favors from enemy.

- (d) Article IV. "Keep faith—no harm to comrades—take command." See DA Pam 30-101.

*1. Military member:*

"Keep faith" provision: group unity and the strength there from; primary duty to fellow fighting man.

"Take command" provision: the basis of military organization. How to set up command and staff or committees to support. Functions of command in camp—welfare of prisoners, reporting needs to enemy, demands for proper care, work details, arbitration of disputes, internal security to control possible informing or other illegal acts and punishment therefore, communication with friendly forces, etc.

*2. Legal member:*

Geneva Conventions prescription for who is to command; what to do if everyone is nonrated; right of prisoners to organize; limiting communication with enemy to command or elected representative.

Legal implications of failure to "keep faith"—crimes against fellow prisoners and punishment under UCMJ.

Legal requirements for obeying senior or battlefield extends unchanged during captivity,



### 3. *Medical member:*

Emotional requirement for "keeping faith" for a sense of security and support.

The psychology of command, giving reassurance and support to members of unit.

Necessity for close unity and firm command to insure life-or-death essentials of camp sanitation, group and personal hygiene, care of sick and wounded—all in a systematic way.

- (e) Article V. "Name, rank, service number, and date of birth—disloyal statements." See DA Pam 30-101.

#### 1. *Military member:*

Denial of information to enemy; all knowledge possessed by soldier is potential military intelligence.

How intelligence is collected from bits and scraps of information, making any communication of potential value to enemy.

Demonstration in Korea and previous wars that a prisoner is not treated better for talking—is never let alone, constantly harassed; man who sticks to name, rank, service number, and date of birth is more likely to be left alone; must do this in a soldierly fashion, not provoke unnecessary retaliation.

Value to enemy of disloyal statements; use in psychological warfare to influence world—giving enemy propaganda can be tantamount to giving him a ship or an airplane.

Tricks used by enemy in the form of broadcasts and special letters home, personal history questionnaires; any cooperation by prisoner in these things, or even in "discussions" or arguments with enemy personnel, constitutes going far, beyond name; rank, service number, and date of birth and must be guarded against.

## *2. Legal member:*

Requirement by Geneva Conventions that prisoner give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. Duty explicitly stops there; enemy needs no other information even though he says he does so he can "tell your parents at home that you are all right."

Prohibition by Geneva Conventions on any form of duress or torture; must remember that routine discipline in communist army can be more severe than in ours, but this is not torture. However, regulations do not require prisoner to commit suicide or stand indefinite physical torture.

## *3. Medical member:*

Psychologically vulnerable position of POW being interrogated; natural

impulse to try to give appearance of cooperation to avoid captor's displeasure—this must be avoided. "Cooperation" breeds the enemy's contempt; will continue to demand it once begun.

Psychological impossibility of lying successfully for prolonged periods; moral strength completely lost if caught in lie (which will inevitably occur).

Severe emotional results of disloyal statements—guilt and anxiety, feeling of less of unity with fellow POW and with home and country; depression, worry, fear of retaliation at home, etc.

- (f) Article VI. "Responsible for my actions—Trust in God and the U. S. A." See DA Pam 30-101.

*1. Military member:*

Never forget role as soldier. Can be effective soldier even in captivity.

Trust in God and the U. S. A. essential and should be talked about by prisoners; must know that your Government is trying to contact and liberate you, will never forget you, and will care for your family.

*2. Legal member:*

"Responsible for my actions" not just as soldier under UCMJ but as citizen; even harder to live up to in

prison but even more important there than ever—just as on the battlefield.

3. *Medical member:*

Sense of responsibility will enhance all other points, permit unification for resistance, give each man a sense of strength.

Personal responsibility will insure care of others who are sick and injured, proper measures for insuring health and welfare of all.

Genuine faith and trust are among strongest psychological supports a human being has, both in battle and in POW camp. These are the things which make our system different from communism, and are the best weapons any man ever, had.

- (7) The above are merely examples of items which can be discussed. Others can easily be prepared by the team members in a preliminary conference. Local conditions may permit inclusion of examples, incidents, or ideas which are currently receiving attention in your unit.
- (8) A presentation of this kind is much more effective when concrete examples and personal experience and knowledge are used. The use of combat-experienced officers or former prisoners as instructors should provide practical illustrations of "keeping faith," "never surrendering," and "being responsible." However, exercise care to insure that instruction does not degenerate

into a simple recitation of "war stories."

- (9) Further examples and illustrative material can be gained by careful reading of DA Pams 21-71 and 30-101. Following a presentation by a team, utilize a question period, seminar, or guided discussion period. This can be entirely spontaneous, or questions might be put to trainees based upon the presentation or upon further study of discussions in the cited pamphlets about communist propaganda exploitation.
- (10) At the conclusion of such a session, present a brief summary emphasizing that the Code of Conduct is not something to be put aside until one finds himself in captivity. The standards of the code are equally applicable to everyday soldiering. They merely reiterate the qualities that all training is designed to implement discipline, leadership, pride and faith in the unit and in one's fellow soldier, service to the United States and protection for its people, and loyalty and soldierly behavior on the battlefield.

*b. Indoctrination Subjects.* All of these subjects have the objective of developing the individual to meet the standards embodied in the Code of Conduct. Instructors presenting these subjects must review their presentation, emphasizing specific applications of the moral and ethical principles involved, to the articles enumerated in the Code of Conduct.

*c. Field Sanitation, First Aid, and Personal Hygiene.* The soldier must be imbued with the importance of first aid and how it may be applied to save his life or the life of his fellow soldier in training,

in combat, or in captivity. The practical application of field sanitation and personal hygiene must be emphasized to develop in the soldier an appreciation of his personal obligation to himself and his buddies. This is part of the "responsibility" in Article VI, and is in keeping with the articles in the Code of Conduct which state, "I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners." It requires on the part of the soldier an understanding of the article relating to taking command and obeying the lawful orders of those appointed over him.

*d. Squad and Platoon Patrolling.*

- (1) Apply extensive use of Aggressor forces to provide realistic training in actual evasion and escape methods., Article, III of the code states, "I will make every effort. to escape and aid others to escape." This phase of training is the place to emphasize most effectively that evasion or escape is the primary ditty of men isolated, cut off, or captured. It must further be shown in this phase of training how escape and evasion are most effective as group activities, and that the escape of one individual frequently requires the enthusiastic and untiring efforts of a group.
- (2) Develop situations whereby individual members of the patrol or a small element of the patrol will be cut off or surrounded by the Aggressor, requiring the remainder of the patrol or elements from the parent unit to rescue them. Plans for tactical operations which include provisions for rescue of isolated individuals or 'small groups will instill confidence of the individual in his

unit. This is the place to reemphasize Article VI of the Code of Conduct, "I will trust in my God and in the United States of America," making clear and emphatic the fact that the unit and the Army and the Government do not abandon men who become isolated or fall into enemy hands. By showing that there are standard recovery procedures, that there is no question about whether or not the unit will try to liberate such men and reunite them with the fighting team, the soldier's confidence and spirit are markedly strengthened.

- (3) Through an umpire system, assess casualties to members of the patrol, requiring application of first aid and evacuation by other members of the patrol. This will provide additional training and emphasis on administration of first aid by the individual soldier. It must be remembered that umpires can perform an extremely important function upon the termination of play; the critique is the place to discuss specifically what measures should be employed for caring for fellow soldiers, and whether or not such measures were put into effect by players.

## **5. Advanced Individual Training**

*a.* Enlist the cooperation of chaplains and troop information discussion leaders to include in character guidance and troop information program presentations explicit reference to the code, showing how it fits into things being discussed. The two

general articles of the code, Articles I and VI, are to be especially emphasized in these instructional periods. These articles can be analyzed down to the individual sentences and even the phrases and exact words used, with attention to the concepts of "serve my country," "our way of life," "I am prepared to give my life," "I will never forget," "responsible for my actions," "dedication," "trust." As the soldier is maturing and developing in his advanced individual training, much emphasis must be placed upon these concepts of spirit and dedication, without which his MOS training becomes nothing more than a mechanical trade school instruction and totally inadequate preparation for the military profession.

*b.* Good leadership and the principles of good instruction in any subject or any MOS require that the trainee be shown that his job is important and useful, and that it fits into the large scheme of endeavors by many individuals to accomplish the mission. This increases the interest of the trainee and builds his self-respect and sense of accomplishment. In doing this, however, the instructor must recognize his responsibility to make such explanations and interpretations ring true in terms of the duties of citizenship in its larger sense, and of devotion to the principles and objectives of the nation as a whole. This can be done during training for any MOS, from truck driver to cook, from medical lab technician to secretary, to demolition expert.

## **6. Basic Unit training**

*a.* Place emphasis on developing spirit, beginning at squad level. Research and studies in military



psychology have demonstrated over and over again that the strength of the fighting man comes principally from his position as a member of a team, a group. The Code of Conduct recognizes this in prohibiting the acceptance of favors from an enemy (which requires abandoning the team), in insisting upon backing up command, aiding others to escape, and being responsible for one's actions. The squad is the place where such ideals get their first and most important application, and this must be said again and again in training.

*b.* Impress individuals with the concept that unit objectives are accomplished as a result of coordinated efforts of individuals and not by independent actions of individuals. That this is true has been demonstrated on a thousand battlefields, and the: prisoner of war situation should be described and understood as simply one kind of battlefield, or an extension of the one where shooting takes place. The principle applies most strongly in the code's reference to "continuing to resist by all means available," "keeping faith with fellow prisoners," and "aiding others to escape."

*c.* Emphasize in training the operations of isolated units from squad through company size and the development of standing operating procedures for such circumstances: Isolated units must be trained to utilize their own firepower and fighting ability to continue to resist. This type training instills confidence in the men as to the unit's ability to resist and confidence that the parent unit will put forth every effort to relieve an isolated unit.

## **7. Advanced Unit Training**

*a.* Apply the principles described in basic unit

training at this level with the objective of preparing larger numbers of men to present these principles effectively to their own subordinates and smaller units.

*b.* Emphasize maximum combat realism during this phase of training to develop mental and physical preparation to enable the individual to survive and meet the requirements of the code.

*c.* Continue training in operation of, isolated units during this phase of the training program.

## **8. Army Training Tests**

Army training tests provide an excellent method of testing adequacy of Code of Conduct training. New and future revisions of unit tests will include situations based on the concepts of the code. Pending publication of revision of tests, responsible commanders will insure that all training tests administered contain requirements necessary to test training in the Code of Conduct.

## **9. Field Exercises and Maneuvers**

(app. III)

*a.* Preexercise and maneuver orientation should include the following:

- (1) Evasion, escape, and survival techniques.
- (2) Reorientation on the Code of Conduct.

*b.* Maneuver prisoners.

- (1) Introduce maneuver prisoners to the techniques of interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation of prisoners. Using maneuver prisoners, do this by actual demonstrations showing how interrogations are conducted, how men are encouraged in a

friendly fashion to fill our personal history forms (which violates the "name, rank, service number, and date of birth" provision of the code), how interrogators or enemy "instructors" can act in a friendly fashion and seem not to be interested in military information while they are tricking the prisoner into starting to communicate with them, and rewarding them for "cooperativeness." This should be done only by personnel who have studied DA Pam 30-101 and who can act in accordance with it.

- (2) It is neither necessary nor permitted to subject maneuver prisoners to physical abuse; however they should be subjected to hardships comparable to those that a frontline soldier would experience during the maneuvers. Impress soldiers with the fact that becoming a maneuver prisoner is not the easy way to avoid the hardships inherent to maneuvers. Devote a significant portion of the critique to POW play and include numbers; captured, circumstances of capture, prisoner resistance, number of escapees, and resistance to interrogation, indoctrination and exploitation. Otherwise, training derived from play of maneuver prisoners is restricted to the few individuals who were prisoners.

c. Emphasize training in the operation of isolated units to eliminate the pessimistic concept of a "'cut-off" unit. Train units to accept temporary isolation on the battlefield as normal to

combat and to rely on their own capability to continue their combat mission.

*d.* Plans for tactical operations must include provisions for contacting and recovering isolated units and individuals; and for providing combat and logistical support by air; to instill confidence in individuals and small unit commanders that their unit can continue resistance though isolated and that the parent unit has effective methods to relieve such isolated units.

*e.* Appendix III is a sample evasion exercise. Although it is geared to a specific situation and the terrain at Fort, Benning, Georgia, this exercise can be modified to suit the requirements of training units on different terrain.

## APPENDIX III

### EVASION EXERCISE

---

#### 1. General Situation

*a.* Aggressor forces have landed on the coast of FLORIDA, vicinity PANAMA CITY and in the past 2 weeks have succeeded in establishing an extensive foothold that extends from MOBILE, Alabama, OPELIKA, Alabama, COLUMBUS, Georgia, and bounded on the east by the CHATTAHOOCHEE River. Two days ago Aggressor succeeded in overrunning defensive positions in the vicinity of FORT BENNING, Georgia. Your unit, 1st Platoon, A Company, 1st Battle Group, 87th Infantry, 10th Infantry Division, an interior unit, occupied defensive position along the OCHILLEE Creek. At 0500 today Aggressor attacked units in both adjacent areas who were pushed back and the MLR of the 10th Division overrun.

*b.* Your squad has been occupying a portion of the COPL along OCHILLEE Creek (see situation map). The Aggressor attack at 0500 did not include your position; however, it did include your battle group portion of the MLR, and the friendly units were forced to withdraw to a new defensive position.

*c.* Your positions are surrounded by the enemy, but they have made no attempt to come into the area nor to capture you. Communication by radio from C0, 1st Battle Group, 87th Infantry, ordered you to abandon your position and rejoin the unit

in the vicinity of EELBECK 114915. Your radio is now out of order.

## **2. Mission**

Using evasion tactics, infiltrate from your squad position (see situation map) to vicinity EELBECK and assemble with the 1st Battle Group, 87th Infantry.

## **3. Requirements**

*a. First Requirement.* Actions of the squad leader.

*b. Second Requirement.* Movement to rejoin 1st Battle Group, 87th Infantry.

*c. Third Requirement.* Individual action upon capture and interrogation.

## **4. Critique**

*a. Location.* Vicinity EELBECK.

*b. Scope.* Each group will be debriefed and critiqued on its conduct during the problem.

*c. Time.* As each group reaches objective.

*d. Personnel Present.* Critiquing officer and evading personnel.

*Note.* While the location of this exercise is established in the vicinity of Fort Benning, Georgia, the exercise can be modified to fit any locality.

## **5. Safety**

*a. Responsibility.* Principal instructor will have overall safety responsibility.

(1) Aggressor commander reports safety violation

and accidents relative to Aggressor to principal instructor.

- (2) Senior interrogator reports safety violation and accidents in interrogation area to principal instructor.

*b. Safety Rules.*

- (1) No live ammunition used at any time or place during problem.
- (2) Rattlesnakes are a hazard in the area. Snakebite kits are provided (outline snakebite SOP).
- (3) No fires will be started in the problem area.
- (4) Vehicles will be moving throughout the area and at night may be driven under blackout conditions.
- (5) Avoid the many deep erosion gulfs in the area.

## **6. Control Personnel**

*a. Principal Instructor (1).*

- (1) Check schedules insuring grain available, Aggressor personnel, and unit .to undergo training.
- (2) Rehearse Aggressor.
- (3) Check communication.
- (4) Check road guards.
- (5) Check safety.
- (6) Check arrangement for reception and orientation of observers.
- (7) Conduct class orientation.
- (8) Supervise conduct of exercise.

- (9) Organize and conduct or supervise critique.
- (10) Give EEI to interrogation teams:
- (11) Check clearance of all personnel from problem area.

*b. Assistant Instructors.*

(1) *Officer assistant* (1).

- (a) Be prepared to replace and/or assist the principal instructor.
- (b) Check organization and control movement of participating unit to the tactical release point.
- (c) Check police, of orientation area and tactical release point.
- (d) Report to Aggressor commander time of departure of first and, last group.
- (e) Release four enlisted instructors from starting point, after all participants have cleared the tactical release point.
- (f) Report to principal instructor and assist in control of conduct of problem.

(2) *Enlisted assistant instructors* (4).

- (a) Assist in organization of orientation area and tactical release point.
- (b) Guide participating unit (squads) from orientation area to tactical release point.
- (c) Report departure of participating unit from the release point to officer assistant instructor.
- (d) Police area.
- (e) Secure training aids and transport them to storage area (vicinity interrogation area).



- (f) When released by officer, assistant instructor will report to interrogation area to act as Aggressor guards for balance of the problem.

(3) *Interrogation personnel* (Army teams).

- (a) Organize interrogation center.
- (b) Coordinate with principal instructor for EEL
- (c) Conduct interrogations.
- (d) Analyze and, report results of interrogation.
- (e) Close interrogation center.

(4) *Critique officer* (1).

- (a) Conduct debriefing and. critique of each group of evaders.
- (b) Check off, on company rosters, personnel who have completed problem. Will coordinate with company tactical officer to insure that all participants are accounted for prior to leaving the problem area.

## **7. Enemy Representation**

*a. Number.*

1 Officer

40 EM

*b. Uniform and Identification.* Aggressor uniform.

MI RAIN.

Web site: [www.military.com](http://www.military.com) and contact.

Unsubstantiated information. **EVASION EXERCISE**

Postcard of a military exercise.

1. **MIN AREA: 3X10 MILES**

2. **TIME REQUIRED: 12-24 HOURS**

3. **MIN CONTROL PERSONNEL**

4. **1 OFFICER (P)**

5. **4 AGO'S ASST P's**

6. **1 OFFICER (BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING)**

7. **40 EM AGGRESSORS**

8. **1 OFFICER (ARMY INTERROGATOR)**

9. **4 EM INTERROGATORS**

10. **1 OFFICER (AGGRESSOR COMMANDER)**

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*c. Equipment.*

M1 Rifles.

Web belt w/first aid packet and canteen.

Raincoats or ponchos.

Flashlight w/batteries.

Snake bite kit.

11 ¼-ton trucks.

1 ¾-ton truck.

1 CP or small wall tent.

4 AN/PRC-6 radios.

1 AN/GRC-8 radio w/veh mounted.

*d. Duties and conduct.*

- (1) Organize into three 9-man squads and one 4-man headquarters group.
- (2) Establish and maintain communication with problem control center.
- (3) Establish screening patrols (annex 1).
- (4) Bound patrols from initial position to successive positions (see situation map), only on order of principal instructor or his officer assistant.
- (5) Capture and process POW's.
- (6) Evacuate POW's to interrogation center.
- (7) Aggressor commander responsible for coordinating with principal instructor for rehearsals; reporting time and place for start of problem; feeding Aggressor troops; Aggressor safety; clearance of Aggressor troops and coordinating with principal instructor for release at end of problem.

## **8. Communications**

(See Communication Plan (annex 2).

## **9. Troop Orientation**

*a. Personnel to conduct.*

(1) Principal instructor.

(2) Four NCO assistant instructors.

*b. Location.* See situation map.

*c. Scope.* Cover the following points:

(1) Safety rules.

(2) Limits of problem area.

(3) Conduct of the exercise.

(4) Initial situation.

## **10. Critique**

*a. Location.* Vicinity EELBECK.

*b. Scope.* A debriefing for each evasion group.

(1) Identity of evadee's troop unit.

(2) Former location and mission.

(3) Time and circumstances forcing evasion.

(4) Trace evasion route.

(5) Enemy encountered in evasion area.

(6) Location and circumstances of friendly contact.

(7) Any other information evadees offer.

*c. Time.* Immediately upon the arrival of each evasion group in the assembly area.

*d. Personnel Present.*

(1) Evasion group.

(2) Debriefing officer.

## 11. Interrogation Phase

*a. Personnel* (Army Interrogator Teams estimated number).

5 Officers

10 EM

*b. Uniform.* Aggressor uniform.

*c. Equipment.* TOE interrogator team equipment: One AN/GRC-8 radio (problem control net).

*d. Duties.*

- (1) Organize interrogation center.
- (2) One team attached to Aggressor headquarters to conduct tactical interrogation similar to that in a battle group area, and assist in the processing of POW's.
- (3) Analysis and report results of interrogations.
- (4) Close interrogation center and coordinate release from the area with the principal instructor.

## 12. Medical Aid

*a. Personnel.* Two-aidmen w/1/4-ton ambulance.

*b. Duties.* To establish emergency medical aid services, under the direction of the principal instructor.



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By order of *Wilber M. Brucker*, Secretary of the Army:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,  
*General, United States Army.*  
*Chief of Staff.*

Official:

R. V. LEE,  
*Major General, United States Army,*  
*The Adjutant General.*

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*NG*: State AG (2); units same as Active Army except quantity will be reduced 50%.

*USAR*: Same as Active Army.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 32050.





